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MH2
Boulder climber
Andy Cairns
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Also one of the great things about meditation you can do when you get old and it is completely accessible and it is free. I think most people don't try it because they just don't see what it could possibly offer them. I think generally it is looked at as an obscure practice to sit very still and experience things as they are for 30 minutes.
Could be said of the public library as well.
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jgill
Boulder climber
The high prairie of southern Colorado
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Also one of the great things about meditation you can do when you get old and it is completely accessible and it is free
How does it work for Alzheimer's afflicted?
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MikeL
Social climber
Seattle, WA
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John,
That’s been a lament and worry for many monks as they got sick or infirm or old.
You know, of course, that there is no idyllic narrative of life, least not as people would imagine . . . a pollyanna tale of sugar plum fairies, white clouds, and some old bearded guy sitting on a large golden chair behind pearly gates. (Well, maybe in Scottsdale, AZ.)
This is not a philosophical issue. Things happen. None of them are very real, least not as we conventionally think of them. Look back at any memory. No matter how severe and dramatic it seemed then, . . . now it’s not so much, is it? If you want to look at it scientifically, the body (and all its accoutrements) seems to manage everything quite well. Almost everything comes back to an equilibrium, to the same state, to the same sense of awareness that you call “me” or “I.” You get really sick, and your awareness seems to power down; you get threatened and adrenaline pumps up. You get older and your views change. It’s difficult, if not impossible, to make any real comparisons, even from one day to another.
Perhaps no matter where you are or what’s going on for you in your life, you can almost always just relax as an old man (like you and me) basking in the sunlight. That is a kind of meditation that perhaps more of us should take advantage of.
No one needs to get hung up on achieving special states regarding meditation. If you believe some really old guys from the past, there is no difference between nirvana and samsara. It just looks that way.
;->
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jogill
climber
Colorado
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^^^ Good comments, Mike.
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PSP also PP
Trad climber
Berkeley
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Mike L said "No one needs to get hung up on achieving special states regarding meditation."
+1 Mike; one of the lines in the heart sutra is "no attainment with nothing to attain"
from my understanding The Buddha used meditation to take a close look at the origin of suffering, not to get stuff.
Trying to get stuff is the tail chasing path.
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Largo
Sport climber
The Big Wide Open Face
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Topic Author's Reply - Oct 7, 2015 - 10:42am PT
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How about our assumptions per the whole “mind” discussion, including the conviction that mind is just another phenomenon and we can approach mind in the same way we approach any other object. Or the fact that objective emergence does not work as a metaphor for mind. Why, because (excepting mind), what emerges from an object is always another object or phenomenon we can wrangle with our sense organs, if not directly, then by way of instruments that measure an output, etc. And so we often revert to grabbing hold of what we can (objective functioning) and saying, viola, THAT is mind, right there, that electro-chemical activity in the brain. That is real, you see.
In this view, mind is not an organic, indivisible, dynamic process, rather it is the mechanical output of a computational sequence arising from the brain. Seems obvious.
The next assumption is that this output is entirely mechanical, and as such, any fragment of this output can, in theory, be digitized (or translated into some sort of numerical-based code) and stored in modular form. Then once the technology is available, the mental data stream can once more be rebroadcast, yada yada.
This, in simplified form, is the basis of what we call whole brain emulation (WBE) or mind uploading (sometimes called “mind copying” or “mind transfer”). And it all makes perfect sense – till you start trying to implement it according to the assumptions just mentioned. My friends over at Caltech found this out in their own way and it is fun to approach WBE as would-be programmers or “mind uploaders” because it forces us to look at the whole shebang in very practical terms. And we can learn a lot about our assumptions per mind.
Technically speaking, WBE (whole brain emulation) “is the hypothetical process of copying mental content (including long-term memory and ‘self’) from a particular brain substrate and copying it to a computational device, such as a digital, analog, quantum-based or software-based artificial neural network. The computational device could then run a simulation model of the brain information processing, such that it responds in essentially the same way as the original brain (i.e., indistinguishable from the brain for all relevant purposes) and experiences having a conscious mind.”
Sounds like 5.7. Now, let’s try and make real, in a hypothetical way, the process as just described. First, let’s look at how we might “copy mental content (including long-term memory and ‘self’) from a particular brain substrate.” We have to clearly know what this means if we want to do the deed.
So – what is meant by “substrate?”
noun sub•strate \ˈsəb-ˌstrāt\
Definition of SUBSTRATE
1: the base on which an organism lives <the soil is the substrate of most seed plants>
If we take this common usage definition as our starting point, we can probably agree that in the sense it is used, substrate refers to some “particular” part/function of the brain, likely the neuro-transmissions, the electro-chemical goings on in ye ol’ bean.
Next, what is this “mental content” that we are hoping to copy? Do they mean cognitive/discursive content, or the full experiential array of sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories, intuitions, instinctive responses like sexuality and aggression, etc. Are we to assume all of these subjective dimensions are contained in the neural stream? This is where it starts getting tricky.
We can, of course, power through and say, “Just copy the whole bugger and forget trying to categorize what is involved.” But such glossing over hardly reflects the precision and rigor of serious scientific experiments that we so often hear praised on this thread.
For starters, we have seen that subjective experience is not reductive to objective functioning. The only way we can ever claim as much is to insist that objective and subjective are selfsame, and most everyone readily acknowledges, for example, the difference between a wine steward’s sense of smell (subjective experience) and an acorn (an object “out there”). So if we simply copy neuro activity, we wouldn’t’ be copying experience itself.
But say we quit the niggling and just go with the belief that if we copy and digitize every aspect of neuro activity, Dr. Frankenstein can vitalize it later on. Right now we are only interested in recording the data. So let’s push on.
Leaving the question of “how” we might record the data largely to future technicians, we are still faced with establishing temporal parameters of the measurements. That is, since neural activity is an ever-shifting flow of electro-chemical activity across the entire brainpan, we’d need to record said activity over a period of time, say, from T-1 to T-2, so what we record can be charted on a quantitative time line.
More specifically, let’s agree to record the entire neuro activity of Dr. Ed’s brain from 8AM on Oct. 1, 2050, to 9AM on Oct. 1 of the same year. That will give us one whole hour of Ed’s “mental content,” recorded and digitized on a “computational device.” As mentioned, never mind HOW we will manage this brain copying and brain transfer to the computational device, and for the sake of this thought experiment, simply consider it done.
Now that we have the data recorded, we next have the computational device “run a simulation model of the brain information processing, such that it responds in essentially the same way as the original brain (i.e., indistinguishable from the brain for all relevant purposes) and experiences having a conscious mind.”
In other words, once the hardware (computational device) and the software (the proscribed neural data stream) is integrated and booted up, the system will itself will be sentient. Never mind how. It just is.
Careful thinkers might already start blanching. There are so many sweeping assumptions - sort of like saying we will scale Half Dome “by means of hands and feet.”
One of the biggest assumptions so far is that human experience is fully represented by and reductive to the “mental content” as so far described (neural activity), which can be copied, digitized and uploaded to a “computational device.” Or at any rate it can be saved in some kind of stand-alone, modular memory unit, and replayed by a piece of hardware that can so perfectly simulate the original host brain that once the information processor’s data is booted up, and the whole mo-fo becomes “conscious,” the result in time and space will be “indistinguishable” from Ed’s original experience.
But is the brain a generic information processing unit, and are all such units selfsame? Of course not.
Anyone who has fiddled with or studied EEG’s or a CAT or PET scanners, MRI’s - or any other piece of brain technology (when used to that end) - can assure you that Ed and Fruity and Mike and John and BASE and Cocoa Joe have brains that share a majority of functions, but whose discrete functions radically vary, person to person. While Nature and nurture are both factors in brain development, everyone knows from first-hand experience that genetics play a major role in the way we are and the way we experience the world, from our actions on down.
Some people are dynamos, others are unfocused, are more emotional, or dead inside (so-called flat affect), or live in their minds not their bodies, or are up and down or excitable or calm or depressed or spacy or driven or lazy – and everything in between.
Bottom line is, if we want to simulate and recreate Ed’s hour of experience so faithfully that “for all practical purposes” it would be “indistinguishable” from the original hour/experience, even to Dr. Ed himself, a generic, one-size-fits-all “simulation model of brain information processing” would never be able to rebroadcast Ed’s hour of glory. That’s a little like saying so long as you have all the primary colors of Ed’s experience, it matters little how you paint them on the canvass. Or so long as you have the DVD, the playback device matters little – except it does because formats vary, and some (PAL and NTSC) are not even compatible because they translate data differently.
Another example would be the face transplant that surgeons recently did over at UCLA. The recipient didn’t look anything like the donor because appearance is largely determined by the underlying bone structure (the hardware) and NOT the flesh itself (software).
One of the problems is that subjective experience is not merely the passive, one-dimensional observation of mental content. There also is the simultaneous meta-level reactions to the content that mechanically bubbles up from our unconscious. We have no control over what bubbles up into our field of awareness, but we can exert some control over how we react to our feelings and thoughts and fears and impulses; and these reactions form a dynamic, meta-level strand in our experience. And at least some of how we react to what arises is owing to the way we are wired – meaning that the brain itself is not merely a passive informational processing device, rather it exerts a dynamic, and unique twist to whatever arises, and all of this contributes to and colors the shape and timbre of what we are calling “mental content.”
And so if we really want to faithfully replicate Dr. Ed’s hour of glory, we will need more than the data stream of “mental content” and any old playback device. We will also need the brain through which said “mental content” is being rebroadcast, which radically contributes to the conscious concert that constitutes Dr. Ed’s subjective experience.
But say we take another view and hold that the brain’s contribution to Dr. Ed’s experience is itself reductive to neural activity, and that so long as we get a faithful enough data stream, the whole McGilla is contained therein, so it’s just a matter of having the right playback (“computational”) device.
MORE LATER...
JL
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MikeL
Social climber
Seattle, WA
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Me: No one needs to get hung up on achieving special states regarding meditation.
DMT’s response: That's been my thinking since day 1.
I’d like to be clear what I meant there. The notion presents a paradox if you look closely at it.
On the one hand, it’s been argued that all experience is essentially the same. It’s called by some, “suchness,” or “thatness.” The very essence of experience is the same ("has the same taste") just as the projections on a television screen. (It’s all pixels, right?)
On the other hand, I think that just about everyone on the planet will state that their experiences are not the same as they perceive them. Some experiences allow one to soar to the heavens (topping out on El Cap), while others allow one to descend into the depths of hell (being terrified in combat, watching death occur all around you).
So, which is it? Are experiences the same, or are they different?
When those really old guys and gals from the past in India and Tibet claim that there is no difference between nirvana and samsara, and that one should not get hung up on “states,” they are pointing to two notions. The first is that there is a difference between content and the medium we can call consciousness (maybe "awareness," if you want to get technical). The second is that (as PSP notes) chasing after states makes states into objects. And if you understand the first point (no difference), then objects don’t quite exist as one might think. Objects are subjective projections.
So, yes, by all means: No special states. But if you will, all “states” would appear to be special in that they are not what we think they are.
(It probably looks like I’m chasing my tail here, hmmm?)
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MH2
Boulder climber
Andy Cairns
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One of the biggest assumptions so far is that human experience is fully represented by and reductive to the “mental content” as so far described (neural activity), which can be copied, digitized and uploaded to a “computational device.”
You are confused, JL.
Thanks to Moosedrool for his intelligence, understanding, humor, and warmth of spirit.
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jogill
climber
Colorado
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^^^
One of the biggest assumptions so far is that human experience is fully represented by and reductive to the “mental content” as so far described (neural activity), which can be copied, digitized and uploaded to a “computational device.”
JL wants this to be the case so badly that he asserts it is. Without such rigidity assigned to the science community his rebuttals have no (meta)physical extent.
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MikeL
Social climber
Seattle, WA
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DMT: A vanilla milkshake is a vanilla milkshake, after all.
Tautologies say nothing, and they prove nothing.
“Brain scans will reveal the subtle truth?” What subtle truth?
Perhaps things have changed mightily, but when I was in grad school studying cognitive science, I heard similar projections about the computer model of the brain (and many other things). That issue is not much of a problem for neuroscience, but neuroscience has its own to contend with. For example, google “the problems with interpreting fMRI data.”
Don’t forget that all the work in that area is correlational, not causal. Although two things may seem to occur at the same time, that does not mean that one caused the other.
What you seem to be presenting are your intuitions. We are supposed to rely upon more than that when coming to stipulating causal connections.
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Largo
Sport climber
The Big Wide Open Face
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Topic Author's Reply - Oct 7, 2015 - 05:10pm PT
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One of the biggest assumptions so far is that human experience is fully represented by and reductive to the “mental content” as so far described (neural activity), which can be copied, digitized and uploaded to a “computational device.”
JL wants this to be the case so badly that he asserts it is. Without such rigidity assigned to the science community his rebuttals have no (meta)physical extent.
Such a strange comment from my perspective. Wonder if anyone actually reads what is written, or just sees their own projections?
The above "assumption" is based on the quoted claim of those who believe in brain copying. They "assume" that mental content can be copied and stored. That is said so (in the quote) in plain English.
Are you saying that they DON'T say that, insofar as the quote says they DO in plain and simple English? And where did you ever get the wild idea that I believe in that "rigid" understanding, or that such an understanding is actual science? I haven't even gotten into my ideas on the subject. At this point I am only presenting the material.
And Dingus, you should review your ideas in light of what is actually being said. You are trying to prove the uniformity of experience by virtue of the sameness of WHAT is being experienced, believing, I suppose, that the person, place, thing or phenomenon exerts a uniform effect on all brains which in turn renders a uniform experience to all subjects.
We can easily see why this is wildly mistaken - not because I claim it is, but based on strict, anecdotal evidence.
First, for your uniformity belief to be remotely possible, all brains would have to be the same, and anyone working in the field will avouch that while there are many similarities, every brain is unique, regardless of what area lights up under stimulus.
Second, you need to get giggy with the meta level of brain response to neurological impulses - that is, I might taste vanilla and hate it, and introject all kinds of reactionary inferences into my experience, whereas you might love vanilla and start purring. Purring and hating are responses that result in radically different experiences for the subject.
My sense of this is that you are not thinking in terms of experience, as a dynamic process, but rather in terms of a kind of generic brain registration.
Truth is, experience itself, that is, your on-going subjective content, involves much more than this machine kind of registration, whereby we might all be able to taste, recognize and label with a word, vanilla, or chocolate, or strawberry. That doesn't mean our experience is the same. I hate mayo. Others love it, even it was taken out of the selfsame jar.
JL
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MH2
Boulder climber
Andy Cairns
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Let's see. I was going to do something...
Oh, yes.
PSP also PP: Also one of the great things about meditation you can do when you get old and it is completely accessible and it is free
jgill: How does it work for Alzheimer's afflicted?
[Click to View YouTube Video]
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jgill
Boulder climber
The high prairie of southern Colorado
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The above "assumption" is based on the quoted claim of those who believe in brain copying . . . (JL)
It seems to me you are implying this is the consensus of the scientific community. I'm sure there are "those" who so believe, but I'll bet there are others who don't.
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Largo
Sport climber
The Big Wide Open Face
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Topic Author's Reply - Oct 7, 2015 - 09:40pm PT
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John, I think that most every angle of science has people who believe and those who do not - and they are all scientists. Look at QM and the Copenhagan Interpretation. Ed will tell you flat out that the eminent scientists espousing that view are fumbling the data.
Mind uploading (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading); is a pretty well established angle ..."based on this mechanistic view of the mind. Eminent computer scientists and neuroscientists have predicted that specially programmed computers will be capable of thought and even attain consciousness, including Koch and Tononi,Douglas Hofstadter, Jeff Hawkins, Marvin Minsky, Randal A. Koene,and Rodolfo Llinas.
Such a machine intelligence capability might provide a computational substrate necessary for uploading.
However, even though uploading is dependent upon such a general capability, it is conceptually distinct from general forms of AI in that it results from dynamic reanimation of information derived from a specific human mind so that the mind retains a sense of historical identity (other forms are possible but would compromise or eliminate the life-extension feature generally associated with uploading). The transferred and reanimated information would become a form of artificial intelligence, sometimes called an infomorph or "noömorph."
Many theorists have presented models of the brain and have established a range of estimates of the amount of computing power needed for partial and complete simulations. Using these models, some have estimated that uploading may become possible within decades if trends such as Moore's Law continue.
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In other words, if you have a problem with these ideas - and I believe they are all based on misinformation of mind derived entirely from studying objective functioning - it has nothing to do with the information I am presenting, and will continue to present. The exercise is to look at the general assumptions of these scientists and see where they lead. If you doubt that what they are saying is valid, you might find what I am investigating of some interest. As mentioned, I'm pretty certain that they've no idea about anything but computational processes.
JL
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MH2
Boulder climber
Andy Cairns
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In other words, if you have a problem with these ideas
Which ideas? That a semblance of human thought might be copied to a non-biological medium? How about books, paintings, and music?
it has nothing to do with the information I am presenting, and will continue to present.
Obviously. You present no information, only an opinion.
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WBraun
climber
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neuroscientists have predicted that specially programmed computers will be capable of thought and even attain consciousness
To what is their credit with such mental speculations.
It's already been done since day one, "the living entity in the material bodies."
Because the living entity is part parcel of God they have the all the qualities of God himself but not the quantity.
They can create and destroy along with everything in between those two with limitations which always lead to defects.
Thus they try to independently enjoy.
And thus continuously make nothing but blunders.
Just like the fools wanted to fly and thus created a crude mechanical flying machine.
They had to imitate the bird for example.
The bird was already there and could fly more efficient then any flying machine they built.
The fools want to fly then change your consciousness and you'll be reborn into an appropriate bird body in your next life.
Stupid gross materialists always think they will solve problems by creating a machine which will compound even more problems.
Then their stupid logic immediately thinks, ... well we shouldn't anything then.
Their logic and intelligence is driven by their limited duality of their tiny mind only.
With no control over their dual limitations of the material infected minds their logic shown in this thread.
Largo's presentation is only to point how to transcend the limitations of the bondage of material mind and energies.
Thus his information is not generally understood by those who bound heavily in material consciousness.
Thus you get such nonsense as "You present no information" by the materially infected mind .......
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Ed Hartouni
Trad climber
Livermore, CA
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Largo's "brain copying" provides a compelling argument supporting his contentions of irreducibility (who'd have thought that!)
but of course the entire concept is flawed since we don't yet have a detailed physical theory that would allow us to describe what "brain copying" would entail....
...However, Feyerabend's article Materialism and the mind-body problem and in other writings, he reminds us what the utility of a "theory" is... in particular, to allow us to use the "theory" to create the thing we theorize about...
So assuming we have a complete physical theory of the mind, we could indeed build a simulation of the mind that would completely mimic the mind that arises from our biological presence. That simulation would easily achieve the "Turing test" criteria of being "human."
One could then generalize regarding the underlying mechanism that achieves this, some would call it an "illusion" but that would be difficult given the "mystery of the mind." The reason that we'd generalize the mechanism would be to understand the many ways one could realize this "mind."
One might speculate as to whether or not an existing "mind" could be copied... we have excellent simulations of billions of atoms to study materials but we do not attempt to setup the initial conditions of a similar physical ensemble of atoms in exactly the same way to compare, time step by time step, the "actual article" to the simulation. We are content to demonstrate that the "emergent properties" of the physical material are the same as our simulation output.
Given the simulation, we can learn how the material achieves these properties on the microscopic level... such simulations give us insight in our "reductive" program of understanding.
I don't know if we can achieve such a theory, but if we were to, then this would indeed separate "mind" from "body."
But Largo's "brain copying" is probably absurd at this time...
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