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Lambone
Ice climber
Ashland, Or
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".. if i thought my life was in danger .. and i was rapping 24+ pitches in a storm, i'm pretty sure i'd cut the pig loose and just let it fly to the bottom.
 ricardo"
I agree with Yo, cutting you pigs loose before you are standing on flat ground would be a major mistake. Like he said, what happens when you ropes get stuck, or it gets dark and you are going into hypothermia, you gett off route? What do you do now that you have NO equipment!?
Getting down a major bigwall face often can take more then one day for whatever reason, you need the option to bivi and be able to survive. Cut the bags loose and you have just f*#ked yourself.
I talked to a guy who spent three epic days trying to rap off the NA wall in a mid winter storm. He would tell you with authority that you'd be a moron to cut your bags loose.
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Brian in SLC
Social climber
Salt Lake City, UT
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At the risk of gettin' some of this on me...
Lambone posted, "I am thankful that Yosemite is unlike two other National Parks which are popular climbing destinations...Mt Rainier, and Grand Teton NP. Places where you have to wait in line for a permit and pay to climb. I do hope it never ends up that way, but I am fearfull it will eventualy."
Grand Teton National Park requires a permit only for camping, and not for climbing (which wasn't the case in years past). They (ahem) weathered a lawsuit involving rescue, which, is kind of interesting to ponder (and hooray for the outcome, really). Some parallels perhaps.
See below.
Brian in SLC
WYOMING NATIONAL PARK FATALITY IMMUNITY FOR FAILED RESCUE
JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
949 F.2d 332 (Cir. 10th 1991)
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
November 13, 1991
KEYWORDS: Wyoming, national park, hiking, rescue, discretionary function, immunity.
CASE SYNOPSIS: Plaintiff's decedent died during a hiking trip into defendant's national park. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant. In the absence of laws, regulations, or policies, the appeals court found that regulation of climbing was a matter of choice and judgment. Further, the appeals court found climbing regulation in the park was based upon economic, political, and social policy considerations. Specifically, regulation of backcountry climbing required the site superintendent to balance visitor safety against the need to conserve manpower and economic resources. Similarly, the appeals court found that the scope and availability of search and rescue missions were left to the discretion of rangers to make independent policy decisions. The appeals court, therefore, found that discretionary function immunity applied to plaintiff's allegations of negligence against defendant. Accordingly, the appeals court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of defendant.
***
In this case, plaintiff Hugh B. Johnson, Jr. brought this action alleging that the wrongful death of Ben Johnson was caused by the negligence of the National Park Service in failing to undertake the rescue of decedent. The facts of the case were as follows:
On June 28, 1987, decedent, Ben Johnson, and three companions, Robin Macal, Daniel Feikin and David Wechner, hiked to the summit of Buck Mountain in Grand Teton National Park. Buck Mountain is the seventh highest peak in the Teton Range, rising to an elevation of 11,938 feet above sea level and 5,729 feet (approximately one mile) above the valley floor.
Macal and Wechner had acquired the necessary climbing permit from the Jenny Lake Ranger Station the previous afternoon. The four climbers had varying degrees of experience. Wechner was the designated leader of the party. Johnson was the least experienced, with no technical climbing experience whatsoever. Johnson and his companions began their ascent at approximately 8:00 a.m. via Buck Mountain's east ridge, a nontechnical route.
The four climbers reached the summit at different times between 9:00 and 10:30 a.m.
After gathering at the summit, the group descended in pairs, at different times, via the east face, a nontechnical route regarded as relatively easy. The two most experienced climbers, Macal and Wechner, descended first. They reached Timberline Lake at approximately 12:00 noon, the entire descent taking approximately fifteen minutes. Although Johnson and Feikin began their descent along the east face shortly thereafter, they soon strayed south, entering more difficult and technical terrain. Unable to find their way back to the easier route, Johnson and Feikin attempted to descend the southern route. At some point, however, Feikin resolved he could go no further and remained on a ledge where he was in visual contact with Macal and Wechner waiting at Timberline Lake. Johnson, on the other hand, decided to continue his descent. After leaving the summit, Johnson was in occasional voice contact, but never in visual contact with Macal and Wechner.
At approximately 2:30 p.m. Macal and Wechner decided to summon help from the Park Rangers. Macal ran from Timberline Lake to the trailhead where he retrieved his vehicle and drove to the Moose Visitor's Center. Arriving at the visitor's center at approximately 4:30 p.m., he approached Ranger James Springer and informed him that Johnson and Feikin were off course and stuck, but that he believed there was a ranger in the area. At this point Macal was unaware, and therefore unable to report, that at approximately 3:15 p.m. Johnson had fallen on a hard snowslope, crashed into rocks and sustained a serious head injury and lacerations. Upon receiving Macal's information, Springer made radio contact with Ranger Randy Harrington, who had been in the vicinity of Buck Mountain, to determine whether he knew of any climbers in distress. Ranger Harrington reported that he had encountered four climbers descending Buck Mountain and that they were walking through Death Canyon. After talking with Harrington, Ranger Springer told Macal he should return to Whitegrass Trailhead to wait for his companions.
Macal returned to the trailhead and remained in the area until approximately 8:45 p.m. when Wechner arrived from Timberline Lake. After Wechner reported he had not seen Johnson and that Feikin was still stranded on the ledge, Macal realized the communication between Rangers Springer and Harrington had been erroneous. The four climbers Ranger Harrington reported seeing were Jeff McMullen, Anne Petroni, Macal and Wechner. Ranger Harrington mistakenly assumed that McMullen and Petroni were part of the Wechner group.
Wechner and Macal then drove to the Moose Visitor's Center where they told Ranger Northrup about the previous miscommunication. They informed him Feikin had been on the same ledge for over four hours and Johnson had not been seen since earlier in the day. Both Wechner and Macal were still unaware that Johnson was injured. Northrup contacted Ranger Peter Armington, the Jenny Lake District search and rescue (SAR) coordinator.
Ranger Armington consulted with his SAR team concerning a possible rescue effort. The SAR team is a group of experienced climbing rangers, which to the extent practicable patrols the rugged backcountry climbing terrain. In June 1987 there were eighteen search and rescue rangers in the Jenny Lake Subdistrict. At approximately 9:30 p.m., Armington decided to send climbing rangers Harrington and Larsen to Buck Mountain to retrieve Feikin from the ledge and to look for Johnson. The rangers reached Feikin in the early morning hours, but were unable to locate Johnson. A helicopter search was initiated at first light, 6:15 a.m. Johnson's body was located approximately twenty minutes later in a melt pool near Timberline Lake. Johnson had died from hypothermia at approximately 10:30 p.m. the previous night.
Plaintiff Johnson alleged that "Ben Johnson would not have died but for the Park Service's negligent failure to: (1) adequately regulate recreational climbing activity in Grand Teton National Park; (2) initiate a rescue effort after Macal's initial report; and (3) conduct a reasonable rescue effort after Macal's second report." In response, the United States maintained that Johnson's action was "jurisdictionally barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. 2680(a)." In the alternative, the United States contended that the National Park Service "had no legal duty to rescue Ben Johnson." The federal district court agreed that no legal duty existed herein and granted summary judgment to the United States. Johnson appealed.
In the opinion of the appeals court, the specific issue was whether the district court had erred in no determining "the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(a), applies to the undisputed facts of this case." The appeals court described the discretionary function exception to the FTCA as follows:
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) authorizes civil suits against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property, or personal injury caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. 1346(b).
This broad waiver of sovereign immunity is limited, however, by the discretionary function exception, which prohibits any claim against the United States based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. The discretionary function exception marks the boundary between Congress' willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals. Application of this exception is therefore a threshold issue ‑ a jurisdictional issue which precedes any negligence analysis.
We first consider whether the challenged action is a matter of choice for the acting employee. If a statute, regulation, or policy prescribes a specific course of conduct, then an employee must adhere to the directive and no discretion is involved. If, however, the challenged action is discretionary, we must then determine whether it is of the kind Congress intended to shield through the exception... Congress intended to shield only those governmental decisions based on considerations of public policy ‑ decisions grounded in social, economic and political policy. Accordingly, the discretionary function exception will not bar a negligence claim if the government's policy leaves no room for an official to exercise policy judgment in performing a given act, or if the act simply does not involve the exercise of such judgment.
Accordingly, the appeals court found the specific issue in this instance was "whether the National Park Service's climbing regulation and rescue decisions in Grand Teton National Park are shielded from liability" by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
On appeal, Johnson argued that the Park Service decisions "regarding the nature and extent of mountain climbing regulations in Grand Teton National Park... not to require additional warnings regarding the potential danger of mountain climbing, not to require safety equipment use, not to test the competency of each mountain climber, and not to 'clear' the mountains of all climbers before dark... do not invoke the discretionary function exception."
As described by the appeals court, the following "broad statutory/regulatory framework" governing "Park Service decisions regarding climbing regulation" involved "an exercise of judgment or choice," thus satisfying the first requirement of an immune discretionary function.
By statute, the Park Service is directed to promote and regulate the use of national parks by such means and measures as conform to the fundamental purpose of the said parks which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.
16 U.S.C. 1 (1988)
Grand Teton National Park is to be administered in accordance with this general mandate. According to the affidavit of Jack Stark, Superintendent, Grand Teton National Park, no federal statutes or regulations apply to the National Park Service or to Grand Teton National Park which specify how mountain climbing should be regulated. The Park Service has never promulgated a formal mountain climbing policy or climbing regulations. The Park does, however, require climbers to obtain a permit before departing on a climb. The purpose of the permit system is to educate climbers via face‑to‑face ranger contact.
When a permit is requested, rangers attempt to evaluate the climbers' capabilities, and suggest alternative climbs if appropriate. Rangers have no authority, however, to prohibit climbers from taking a particular route.
No statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for the National Park Service to follow. Decisions as to the extent or nature of mountain climbing regulation are truly the product of the Park Service's independent judgment ‑ they are discretionary.
Johnson, however, argued that these regulatory decisions failed to satisfy the second requirement for an immune discretionary function because "they do not implicate social, economic, or political policy considerations." The appeals court rejected this argument.
To the contrary, Superintendent Stark asserts that each of Plaintiff's contentions have been considered, but were rejected for the following social and economic policy reasons: (1) the inherent dangers of mountain climbing are patently obvious; (2) both manpower and economic resources should be conserved to preserve availability during emergency situations; (3) it would be impractical if not impossible to test competency, monitor equipment use, or "clear" the mountain given the limited available manpower and economic resources; and (4) many Park visitors value backcountry climbing as one of the few experiences free from government regulation or interference.
Plaintiff has presented no evidence to dispute Superintendent Stark's assertions.
We conclude that decisions if, when and how to regulate mountain climbing in Grand Teton National Park go to the essence of the Park Service's judgment in maintaining the Park according to the broad statutory directive. By their very nature, these decisions involve balancing competing policy considerations pertaining to visitor safety, resource availability, and the appropriate degree of governmental interference in recreational activity.
As a result, the appeals court concluded that "the Park Service's actions, insofar as they relate to the regulation of mountain climbing in Grand Teton National Park, are therefore shielded from judicial review by the discretionary function exception."
The appeals court also rejected Johnson's argument that his "failure to warn claim should be analyzed separately from the alleged failure to adequately regulate mountain climbing."
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Link
Trad climber
Yosemite, CA
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My apologies for not posting to this thread (and others) sooner. I try to serve as an info source for local climbing news, somewhat of a horses mouth on NPS climbing issues, but I’ve been absent from many discussions recently. I planned to write a summary of what happened in this accident, what we could learn, etc. (as I’ve done in the past), but unfortunately I left the valley before I had time, and I’ve been distracted ever since.
Werner, good info, as always. I’m glad to see the winter hasn’t made you any more long winded :)
As others have pointed out, there are two things to look at: what Ryugo and Yamanoto could have done differently to survive the storm, and what the NPS could have done differently to save their lives. As far as this forum is concerned, the first of these (what they could have done to survive) is the more important. What the NPS could have done differently is a question for the NPS to debate. I’m not trying to avoid criticism; this just isn’t the place to debate the rescue details. That being said, I will clarify a few things about the rescue for those who are interested.
Lambone, you’ve asked countless times “why didn’t the NPS do something sooner?” It’s a completely valid question, but I’m surprised you’re still looking for an answer. I don’t mean to start a time-line debate, but it’s important for you to understand what happened and why.
The rain started early Sunday morning, and a full rescue effort was under way by Tuesday afternoon (myself and two others breaking trail to the summit while dozens of others geared up to follow). At that same time, late on Tuesday afternoon, Ryugo and Yamanoto likely died. We were too late, by a factor of days, not hours.
Given the how long it takes for an equipped rescue team to reach the summit in blizzard conditions, the NPS would have had to launch a full rescue attempt by mid Monday in order to (maybe) reach Ryugo and Yamanoto by Tuesday afternoon. Of course in hindsight we all wish this had happened, but at the time it didn’t make sense. Few would argue the NPS should launch a full rescue for every big wall party that spends a day and a half in a storm, but in this case that’s what we should have done to save their lives.
So, without a request for help, when should the NPS initiate a rescue? When it’s clear a rescue is needed? What if that’s too late? Unfortunately there are no easy answers. Yes Lambone, as you saw, it was clear on Tuesday that Ryugo and Yamanoto needed help, but by that point there was little we could do to reach them in time. Your frustration that day was justified, as was our own.
As for the first topic, what Ryugo and Yamanoto could have done to survive the storm, here again there is no simple mistake at which to point. They weren’t novices, and they weren’t completely ill equipped. As with most complicated accidents, there are many things they “could have done,” but it’s hard to say which of these they “should have done.” They could have descended at the first sign of bad weather, hauled an expedition porta-ledge, carried cell phones and radios to call for help, or perhaps climbed the route earlier in the season. But should they have done any of these things? That’s a debate we each have to have with ourselves; how safe do we want to be?
I think others have already brought up many of the ways this accident could have been avoided, and I hope we can all learn from these suggestions.
See you all in the spring,
-Link
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Link
Trad climber
Yosemite, CA
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As long as I'm posting, here's something I wrote last month that some of you might enjoy:
We’ve lost the trail again. Wet snow stings my face as I post hole back to the last piece of flagging. Visibility is dropping, and my pink marker is already out of site just a hundred feet back. There, found it. Whipping in the wind, it’s tied to a snag where the trail leaves some trees. Ok, start over, where does it go from here… come on, think, I was just here a week ago sweating in the sun.
The radio strapped to my chest squawks something about the team on the Nose, and I make out Brandon’s voice through the static. “It’s totally socked in. Our last view was a hour ago, and they hadn’t moved.” He must be eyeing the face from below, trying to catch a glimpse through the storm.
They’re dead, they’ve got to be, there’s no way, not in this. We need to move faster. What about the other parties, the team on Salathe, those guys over by Lurking Fear? No one expected this, three days of rain turning to snow. Everyone on the wall is getting hammered. It went from summer to winter overnight.
The snow turns back to rain, then to hale, then back to snow again. Just like the gusting wind, it can’t make up its mind. I’m back on the trail now, flagging trees as I slog up the snow covered ridge. My hands are freezing, gloves soaked through, and every time I stop to fumble with the pink tape I’m urged to press on. Screw the flagging, hurry, just get to the top. But there’s nothing we can do from the summit tonight, not in this crap. All that matters now is marking our breadcrumb path through the white-out so others can follow. Flag another tree.
They’re Japanese, the party on the Nose, just like the party twenty years ago. They’re a pitch above Camp 6, just a few pitches from the top of El Cap, the absolute wrong place at the absolute wrong time. Damn it, why weren’t we here yesterday? We didn’t know. No one asked for help. But should we have known? Should we have been watching out for them? Who’s “we?” Other climbers? The government? It doesn’t matter, damn it, we’re too late.
They got themselves into this. Climbing is dangerous, everyone knows that. If it wasn’t, we wouldn’t do it. Climbing is about accepting risk, sticking your neck out. It’s about being scared, living on the edge. Without that edge it’s not climbing. The best stories are those of self reliance. The closer to the limit, to failure, to death, the better.
Bullsh#t. Climbing is about watching out for your buddy, depending on each other, helping your partner, teamwork. It’s about controlling danger, keeping it in check, saving each other from failure, from death. The best stories are those of rescue. We should have known. We should have been here yesterday.
The debate circles in my head while I search for the trail. It’s getting dark, and we’re still four miles from the summit. “I think it’s over here!” Jim calls over the wind, barely visible through the snow. He’s still fumbling with the flagging when Scott and I catch up. We’re spinning our wheels. The light is going, and we’re freezing, cold enough to cut through the ego. The smartest thing to do is find a bivy for the night and keep flagging ahead of the other teams at first light.
Scenarios play out in my head as we try to build a fire. Soon the conversation turns to stories of our own epics, stormy nights in a porta-ledge, rock fall, running out of food. We smile at our tales of pain, one-upping each other’s stories of discomfort, but inevitably the humor fades, and these stories turn back to questions about the one unfolding in front of us. Weather, equipment, time… by morning dozens of people will be following our trail. I hope we’re not too late.
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Blowboarder
Boulder climber
Sandpoint, Idaho
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Pretty big can of shutthef*#kup right there.
Thanks for sharing that insight into what it was really like up there.
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David Nelson
climber
San Francisco
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Topic Author's Reply - Feb 3, 2005 - 05:29pm PT
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Great posts, Link. I have been dying for you to jump in and share both your first-hand experience of this rescue and your perspective from years of doing rescues. The input from both you and Werner was just what I was looking for in posting this thread.
Nice essay, reflects the dilemma you were in quite clearly.
I think we all agree that no one has the right to demand or expect a rescue, from YOSAR or from their friends. You need to train, plan, and execute as if you are on your own. You are.
Your timeline was to the point: the rescue would have had to start long before it was even reasonably clear that a rescue was needed, in order to have saved them.
This leads me to suggest that communication is a good practice. As a member of YOSAR, would you not recommend that parties carry communication? If they choose not to, they are free to do so, just as they are free to free solo or climb in any way that does not endanger other climbers or damage the rock. But would you not recommend, for safety, that teams carry communication? If nothing else, they can get weather updates from their friends, or call OFF rescues that are not needed when others are worried about their safety. I am not recommending that all parties carry one just so that when the beer runs low or the rain starts, so they can ask for rescue. Rescue should never be expected, we need to be trained in self-rescue, and asking for outside help in the form of a rescue should be reserved for preserving life and limb.
Also, summer is one kettle of fish, and winter ascents are quite another. The margin for error is a lot slimmer and the number of things that can go wrong is quite another. (The rescues of Harding/Rowell and Middendorf come to mind.) In winter, through no fault of your own, the weather can turn from rain to frozen ropes quite unpredictably, and then you are really screwed: self-rescue is impossible. You have to have the guts and equipment to tough it out, get rescued, or die. If one wants to taunt mother nature with a winter ascent, communication sounds as good as a backup anchor at a belay station.
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Link
Trad climber
Yosemite, CA
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David,
Absolutely, looking from a safety standpoint, a radio or cell phone is always a good idea. Small, light, and potentially life saving. Of course, there are more caveats with cell phones than we need to go into here (wilderness philosophy, limited function in some areas, annoying ring tones), and I’d opt for a porta-ledge if it was one or the other… but the bottom line is communication can mean everything in an emergency.
There’s nothing more terrifying, and potentially more dangerous, than true isolation. Of course, that’s part of why we go up there.
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David Nelson
climber
San Francisco
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Topic Author's Reply - Feb 3, 2005 - 08:22pm PT
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Link, I agree. When I think of the level of commitment that it took for the FA teams (when not using seige tactics), not knowing if they could make it or not, not knowing if they had the "right" rack (hell, if their pitons would last the number of placements required), knowing that NO rescue was possible or even conceivable, I realize that we are just babes in the woods by comparison. Hell, we sleep in portaledges, they dangled in slings for the night! Instead of "Do you think this crack goes very far?", we ask, "Did you bring a copy of the SuperTopo?"
Babes in the woods.
The communications does take some of the edge off, I realize. Less of an adventure if the outcome is not in doubt until the very end. I have blasted off from the Valley floor on a FA, with no known outcome, and it was heady. Quite a thrill.
On the other hand, would not a smart climber sometimes elect to retreat if the weather takes a turn and a winter storm was on its way? Would not a smart climber want to spare the YOSAR team from sticking their necks pretty far out (I am thinking of the personal risks the teams took in October) when it was not necessary for them to come attempt a rescue?
We each make our choices. I think I would rather accept the possibility that something potentially fatal might happen up there, and communication may be the thing that gets me back to my kids. Cellphone/TalkAbout with backup for me.
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'Pass the Pitons' Pete
Big Wall climber
like Oakville, Ontario, Canada, eh?
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Link and Werner,
Thanks for answering my question. I now fully get why nobody got there any sooner.
Ricardo - who is actually rather clever and not normally such a complete dumbass - wrote,
".. if i thought my life was in danger .. and i was rapping 24+ pitches in a storm, i'm pretty sure i'd cut the pig loose and just let it fly to the bottom."
Lissssssssen up, kiddies - if you are stuck on a wall in a storm, and you are attempting to rappel to safety, NEVER DROP YOUR PIG! Your pig contains all your supplies to keep you alive in the event you further bugger yourself.
There is no excuse for the Japanese not to have known the rappel route since [url="http://www.supertopo.com/topos/yosemite/thenose.pdf"]the rappel route is published here on pages 15 and 16.[/url]
Rappelling with a pig, even a very heavy one, is EASY! You can click here to learn about [url="http://www.rockclimbing.com/forums/viewtopic.php?topic=4008&forum=19&5"] how to rappel with a very heavy load.[/url] I apologize - I had hoped to share a diagram of how to do this, but the person who made the diagram has removed it from where it used to be. Surprisingly, this technique is not universally known - although Ricardo in fact knows how - and within the past couple-three years one of the biggest climbing magazines actually published a technical tip that was completely wrong. If the Japanese had known how to do this, they might well be alive today. If you climb big walls, you should also know how to do this.
Cheers,
Dr. Piton
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Moof
Trad climber
A cube at my soul sucking job in Nor. CA
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Canadian Assassin, you're my HERO!
Cough, gag...
Bile tastes funny.
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Lambone
Ice climber
Ashland, Or
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"Pretty big can of shutthef*#kup right there."
uhhh...no, not really. Link is just basically saying he was asking the same questions, but there wasn't much they could do about it.
Link said.
"Yes Lambone, as you saw, it was clear on Tuesday that Ryugo and Yamanoto needed help, but by that point there was little we could do to reach them in time. Your frustration that day was justified, as was our own."
thanks for posting Link.
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akclimber
Trad climber
Eagle River, AK
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"The moment you tie in and head up a rock wall, you and partner are just as you came into this world, and just as you will leave it: on your own."
The voice of reason.
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chutebox
climber
groveland, ca
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Lamb one, or laim one... how does it feel to sit on the ground and second guess everyone?? Did you have any actual involvement in the rescue, or just another looky lue, who wants to armchair quarterback for people with way more experience than yourself?? In all of your highness, I am surprised you didn't run up to the top yourself, throw your well worn rope over the edge, and go get the stranded climbers.
You ought to apologize to Werner B ( an outstanding SAR tech I might add ) for your comments.
To Werner, Link, and other SAR personel whom actually helped...
Good job for rescueing all the other parties, despite a severe storm, multiple stranded climbers, waist deep snow, less support than promised at Tamarack Flat (ie; road not plowed adding miles to the hike) , and all the other inconviences thrown at the rescuers.
To Mr. Takeda, good artical in rock and ice issue 140. It is refreshing to see a SAR veteran, write something positive about Yosar. Seems like the COOL thing anymore is just to bag on them
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David Nelson
climber
San Francisco
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Topic Author's Reply - Feb 13, 2005 - 01:13am PT
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Been thinking about the equipment that the Japanese team had. Although hindsight says they were underequipped, let's be fair and admit that most of us have blasted with less. They did have sleeping bags, bivy sacks, and a tarp. That does not mean that they were properly equipped, let's just be fair. They were not totally unprepared.
In that light, I think that almost any equipment would not hold up to their location, Camp VI, which is a waterfall in the rain, and they were in a pretty violent storm (read Tommy's post, reference at the opening post of this thread). Horrible luck: a very fierce storm and they are sitting under a waterfall. I know about the waterfall, but only because I have been there. I wonder if this kind of info should be associated with the route description?
Better clothes, a portaledge, and a form of communication would have made the difference, I think.
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yosarmike
Mountain climber
CA
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Feb 13, 2005 - 08:37pm PT
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Couple of things to fill in the discussion about the "official report" and its probable value to climbers. First, the "Friends of YOSAR report" is written by Nate Knight, based on the info he has, but it isn't "official." We -- Friends of YOSAR -- raise money for YOSAR training and a lot of personal equipment, which doesn't get paid for by NPS. YOSAR is a volunteer organization, and we get paid only for "on-assignment" hours. For most of us, there's no "salary through taxes or entrance fees or whatever." So it's really appreciated when we hear references to YOSAR's "professionalism," but be aware "professionalism" doesn't equate to "fat salary."
Like Pete Takeda's account in R&I, Nate's report comes from being a part of the rescues and from talking to other participants, plus use of the CIR. The "official" version of events is called the CIR ("Critical Incident Report")by the NPS. I have build a db of these CIR reports since the 60's up through '98 (and am slowly plugging along toward the present). The db info is available from me. Send me a name and approximate date and I can send you some info. However, both the db and the original version of the CIR (except the Harding-era ones, which are a lot spicier) are pretty dull reading, because the emphasis -- this is, after all, the federal government -- is on how much money was spent on a rescue, and for what. So my suggestion is that the "official" version is not what any of us would be most interested in as climbers.
The most useful document that will come out of the October rescues will be John Dill's analysis for "Accidents in NA Mountaineering" which will be out in a few months. As with all his reports, it will be worth waiting for.
What we -- Nate and me and FOYOSAR -- would like to know is what things you would like to see on friendsofyosar.org. YOSAR's work isn't 100% climbing related, but a lot of the more difficult rescue stuff does relate to climbing, so your ideas on building the website's contents would be greatly appreciated. So would your $$, but that's another story.
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David Nelson
climber
San Francisco
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Topic Author's Reply - Feb 16, 2005 - 07:51pm PT
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YosarMike,
I would like to see an update to John Dill's classic essay on injuries and deaths in Yosemite, and a web-based version of John's ANAM report. The nice thing about a web-based report is that there are no space limitations and the cost of color photos is zero. The published report needs to be short, but the web-based report does not. As long as it is identified, speculation and personal opinions of several participants is quite valuable, particularly if they differ. If we post a link to it here, the subsequent discussion can be as valuable as the original report.
The great thing about John's original essay is the authority with which it was written: all the advice was amply backed up with facts.
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warpath
Gym climber
Sedona, AZ
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Feb 17, 2005 - 12:14am PT
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I tend to agree with Chutebox. I think lambone is way out of line. Is this guy a climber? a poser? a know it all? How is he so intelegent on this subject? Personally I think he is a poser that likes to start sh*t.....kind like that guy blowboarder? a couple of armchair climbers!!!!!!
Good Job Yosar!!!
Josh
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WBraun
climber
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Feb 17, 2005 - 12:26am PT
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No he's not, he's a thinker just like us all, he was not afraid to ask some serious questions that were bothering him. His true feelings were to help his fellow man. He became frustrated that he could not save them. He’s been there at the face of death like so many of us and he had the understanding of what it’s like. His approach may have been easily misunderstood in the heat of the moment. Delusion of the real facts sometimes overcome us. He definitely is NOT a poser and a real climber to boot. Do not blow off blowboarder either as he is not what you see. One must seriously note and ponder all the facts before we come to foolish conclusions that do not fit them.
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Lambone
Ice climber
Ashland, Or
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Feb 17, 2005 - 12:33am PT
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no, he's right...Yosar did a great job saving thos guys who were getting cold and wet tucked up in their portaledges.
cheers, here's to a job well done. All rescuers made it back and that's what counts. I'm sorry they could not save the Japanesse, it was a tough situation, one I hope to never be caught in up there.
I have deleted most of what I wrote up above, so I am sorry if alot of the posts seem out of context. Not because I didn't mean what I said, but more because I don't believe I was thinking carefully enough about the way I said it. I am sorry if I hurt anyones feelings or stirred up emotions, I meant no disrespect and don't believe I said anything that disrespected the dead, their friends or families.
WBraun said:
"He became frustrated that he could not save them."
This was true, when word broke that morning that there was no hope for them, I shed tears over it. Terrible feeling knowing climbers are dieing in front of your eyes and you can't do a damn thing about it.
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T2
climber
Cardiff by the sea
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Feb 17, 2005 - 12:38am PT
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Right on Lambone!!
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