Discussion Topic |
|
This thread has been locked |
MikeL
Social climber
Seattle, WA
|
|
Ed: By material, here, we have essentially extended the concept to include those phenomena which are describable as physical systems.
It’s the “. . . phenomena that are describable as physical systems” that I need to see from you.
Phenomena are subjective, no? Or are you saying that phenomena are objective?
|
|
MH2
Boulder climber
Andy Cairns
|
|
MikeL,
Your calling the computer a model for the brain is probably fair in some sense. I use the word model loosely, as we use most words, and there are many kinds of models, including probably even models of models.
What I would prefer to see in a model of the brain is an explanation or prediction of some phenomenon that we do not already understand. The computer is little help, here. Memory is almost certainly not stored or accessed in the brain the way it is in a computer. And when I say a model of the brain, I mean a model that represents all of the brain's functions, not just learning and memory. That is not likely to ever happen, so I have stacked the deck in my favor; it is I who am not fair.
Once we have knowledge about the model, this knowledge has to be ‘translated’ into knowledge about the target system. It is at this point that the representational function of models becomes important again. Models can instruct us about the nature of reality only if we assume that (at least some of) the model's aspects have counterparts in the world. But if learning is tied to representation and if there are different kinds of representation (analogies, idealizations, etc.), then there are also different kinds of learning. If, for instance, we have a model we take to be a realistic depiction, the transfer of knowledge from the model to the target is accomplished in a different manner than when we deal with an analogue, or a model that involves idealizing assumptions.
What are these different ways of learning? Although numerous case studies have been made of how certain specific models work, there do not seem to be any general accounts of how the transfer of knowledge from a model to its target is achieved (this with the possible exception of theories of analogical reasoning, see references above). This is a difficult question, but it is one that deserves more attention than it has gotten so far.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/models-science/
|
|
Ed Hartouni
Trad climber
Livermore, CA
|
|
Phenomena are subjective, no? Or are you saying that phenomena are objective?
I think that you can't simply categorize something as "subjective" xor "objective" [xor = (A or B ) and not (A and B)]
We may experience a phenomenon, and it is "subjective" but upon communicating that experience with others and learning about their "subjective" experience, find that there are common aspects that are not dependent on our individual experience, the phenomenon then becomes "objective."
This communication and the subsequent discussion is necessarily a social construction, but one that is at least subject to empirical confirmation... essentially by testing the hypothesis defining the objective aspects of the construction.
It is certainly true that this is not universally general, there being only about 7 billion people that we know about in the universe, the consensus is necessarily limited.
So we have a provisional definition of "objective" in terms of describing phenomena which is subject to change as we acquire new experiences with previously unobserved phenomena, some of that new experience is induced by our search for confirmatory consensus.
|
|
paul roehl
Boulder climber
california
|
|
We may experience a phenomenon, and it is "subjective" but upon communicating that experience with others and learning about their "subjective" experience, find that there are common aspects that are not dependent on our individual experience, the phenomenon then becomes "objective."
Really an excellent and succinct analysis of the subjective/objective relationship. I use it in discussions regarding beauty and the notion it's only in the eye of the beholder.
Your calling the computer a model for the brain is probably fair in some sense.
Again, if that's the case from where comes the software?
|
|
High Fructose Corn Spirit
Gym climber
|
|
If that's the case from where comes the software?
Well, good models for your hardware-software relationship are out there. You should research it. I could give you a chapter's worth but really what would be the return on investment? With supertopo's volatility, poster interest, etc.
.....
We may experience a phenomenon, and it is "subjective" but upon communicating that experience with others and learning about their "subjective" experience, find that there are common aspects that are not dependent on our individual experience, the phenomenon then becomes "objective."
Yes, good working succinct definition.
Ever since Sam Harris published The Moral Landscape he's been pointing out the public's confusion over these terms as well. His basic working definition is similar if not same.
|
|
paul roehl
Boulder climber
california
|
|
Well, good models for your hardware-software relationship are out there. You should research it.
I like the argument you're wrong and you should go research why? Or I could tell you why but you wouldn't listen.
Oh well, back to work.
|
|
MH2
Boulder climber
Andy Cairns
|
|
Would I also need to find you a Coder, paul?
When you speak of the brain having software, do you mean a particular part or function of the brain, or are you just going from the computer analogy/metaphor?
The "software" of the brain may be quite simple:
http://thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/i/i_07/i_07_cl/i_07_cl_tra/i_07_cl_tra.html
yet still allow for the creation of a large repertoire of complex behaviors.
|
|
paul roehl
Boulder climber
california
|
|
When you speak of the brain having software, do you mean a particular part or function of the brain, or are you just going from the computer analogy/metaphor?
I'm trying to come to terms with this metaphor of the brain as "computer-like" machine which needs more complexity in order to achieve human like intelligence.
How is it this "machine" (the brain) has been able to write its own operating code while achieving a continued mechanical complexity? In a computer the two issues code and hardware are remarkably different.
|
|
High Fructose Corn Spirit
Gym climber
|
|
What about hardware though that is not "hard" wired but "soft" wired? Couldn't that be considered a form or variety of "soft-ware", too? So you see it can get rather involved rather quickly esp in a public venue of, shall we say, varying levels of experience or expertise. Just like climbing and other sports and arts. You gotta do the heavy lifting at some point.
I still remember the day or week THIS public venue argued over whether touching the 12V terminals of a 12V car battery would electrocute a person. That there points to where it's at - subject matter expertise wise - on these types of technical issues.
Anyways, that was a good idea... back to work.
PS
"I like the argument you're wrong and you should go research..."
I don't believe I implied anywhere you're "wrong."
|
|
MikeL
Social climber
Seattle, WA
|
|
Ed: We may experience a phenomenon, and it is "subjective" but upon communicating that experience with others and learning about their "subjective" experience, find that there are common aspects that are not dependent on our individual experience, the phenomenon then becomes "objective."
Yes. This is well-articulated (as others here have noted), and the articulation walks a fine line of (as you put it) “xor.”
Seeing patterns (or trapping them experimentally in research studies) happens abstractly and a bit grossly, IMO. As long as they are the result of generalizations, then those models work. Models provide key characteristics by which to label and categorize. Generalizations allow us to communicate, coordinate, integrate, and manipulate things.
However, when one looks down into the minute detail of phenomena, then the patterns evaporate and the R-square declines precipitously. I don’t know how to explain fractals (and their seeming pattern recurrences), but everything else I’m closely aware of looks to be unique, non-repeating, un-definable, and unfindable when I get into the weeds of any phenomena. I get the impression that we force categorizations and labeling.
At fairly high levels of generalization, I see that we come to a great many agreements about what things ARE. Up close and personal, though, not so much. In the depths of research studies, I think we see rampant disagreements.
I think many of us experience this in casual conversations with other folks. What looks like consensus, isn’t really so much. You hear of another person’s experiences in some situation, and you think, “Yeah, it’s just like that” . . . until you start talking about the details of your experiences versus theirs. Then you see that the experiences are often rather different.
The 7 million people on the planet probably do share a consensus about a great many things that we take for granted. We do so perhaps on the “high points.” But specifically, as experiences, maybe not so very much.
I don’t mean to be arguing. I mean to be contextualizing and qualifying (which of course IS arguing for very high levels of specificity).
|
|
Ward Trotter
Trad climber
|
|
I think many of us experience this in casual conversations with other folks. What looks like consensus, isn’t really so much. You hear of another person’s experiences in some situation, and you think, “Yeah, it’s just like that” . . . until you start talking about the details of your experiences versus theirs. Then you see that the experiences are often rather different.
Yes this idea that subjective experiences can be determined or accurately transformed into the validly objective, through language ---is one fraught with difficulty and complexity.
This is the domain of the philosophies of linguistics and language and semantics and has been the subject of much theorizing and investigation.
It may be a mistake to assume that another person is experiencing, or has experienced the identical ,or even the generally similar, in the shared appraisal of a common thing or event, despite a shared faith in language . Such a determination, to be completely worthy of that faith,and all the operative assumptions ,must be dependent upon a precision that is never a given quantity . For a consensus to mean something it must be shown to be relatively free of error.
Moreover ,we come to the intersection of language and psychology to further complicate this process.
|
|
Ward Trotter
Trad climber
|
|
That's because quantifying has eliminated much of the error I spoke of that arise from the purely language driven consensus.
When you tell me to wire the city (involving Ohms Law,for instance) there is a prexisting objective fact that only very minimally involves a semantical project to convert my subjective experience into an objective consensus.
It's an apple and oranges kindathing
|
|
Ward Trotter
Trad climber
|
|
I'm out the door Domingus T. Milk
Maybe later.
O ye of so little faith.
|
|
tolman_paul
Trad climber
Anchorage, AK
|
|
I'm trying to come to terms with this metaphor of the brain as "computer-like" machine which needs more complexity in order to achieve human like intelligence.
How is it this "machine" (the brain) has been able to write its own operating code while achieving a continued mechanical complexity? In a computer the two issues code and hardware are remarkably different.
The limitation of viewing the human brain as a machine like a computer is that the more we learn about the human brain, the more we learn that it isn't nearly as hard wired as we once thought it was. Hence the experiences of our mind can have a physical affect on the brain, as well as physical changes to the brain that affect the mind.
|
|
MikeL
Social climber
Seattle, WA
|
|
DMT:
Yes. Good writing. “Human range.” I think you have it. The other thing you’re referring to has a tremendous amount of emotion in it, and definitions by language are almost useless. It’s the experience of war that connects. It’s such a bizarre experience; there seems to be few others that are that differentiated. So, emotionally there is a connection. That emotion, I would argue, is not, er, . . . you know. (I’m not going to say it and trigger a knee-jerk response.)
Paul and Sully could add-on, but the ability of stories to “take you away” is remarkable, isn’t it? I mean, you leave your reality almost totally. My god, when it happens on the road, it’s mysterious how I don’t get into accidents.
tolman_paul:
What you said.
Moose:
You’re a troll. :-)
|
|
High Fructose Corn Spirit
Gym climber
|
|
Meh. For starters...
"Why should the female humanities voice not be heard?" -Sul
1) Realize there's a great deal more to the "humanities" than literature or stage drama.
Insofar as you're the female "humanities" voice, it is VERY MUCH one-dimensional, imo.
2) People who don't distinguish in discussions or debates between (a) the Humanities culture, eg, at "anti-science" liberal arts colleges and (b) the humanities in general (you know, to incl philos, religion and belief, history, psychology, sociology, arts, architecture, language and linguistics)... are likely confused if not narrow-minded on the issue.
Insofar as I'm critical of the "humanities" it is specifically in regard to the "heretofore" (a) and not (b). With some irony I guess (hard for some to get apparently), it IS my interest in the latter that brings me to these debates, discussions and conflicts.
As a curious aside, just look at a couple poster-science types here who THINK they're among those who DO bridge to the humanities (a) yet know jack-shit about history, religion and/or language and (b) consider it beneath them (somehow noble or the high road not) to involve themselves in religion and/or politics (global or local), the briar patches thereof.
Speaking of the humanities and language, the first thing I did when I "dropped out" of a neurosciences program (in pursuit of a larger goal) was drop in to four years of study in history (in part by travel global and local) and linguistics and language. This included ancient Greek and Latin.
Curious, what's been your experience, academic or otherwise, in Latin and Ancient Greek, Ms "Humanites"? Equally, curious as to your DEPTH of experience in history or philosophy or psychology (evolutionary, developmental, abnormal)?
"I don't tire of pointing out my liberal arts perspective because the science-engineer male voice on ST is so shrill and pervasive." -Sul
3) With all due respect I think you're as erroneous here as you were with your long-term ongoing, completely absurd tvashfruit certainty. I believe insofar as I was "shrill" it was because I was up against the woo group from the very get-go (who were no shrinking violets) - from the very get-go long before your arrival - all of it ensconced in a culture that's every bit as superstitious and anti-science as it is science-based, science-respecting; and insofar as I was "pervasive" I believe it's only been on a couple threads esp in recent years.
Further, in regard to climbing, there's little doubt my experience and seriousness in subject are a great deal more extensive and in-depth than yours.
"What I've learned on this forum is that the "warts and all" types here are the most genuine and trustworthy." -Sul
How ironic / non sequitur a post after its preceding ones.
Like I said...
meh.
.....
.....
btw, "shrill" - perhaps the favorite adjective (over very many years now) used to describe one of my heroes - Richard Dawkins, evolutionary biologist and Professor for Public Understanding of Science at Oxford (retired) - by anti-science, anti-evolution "types" (many from anti-science liberal arts colleges). Speaks volumes. At least to a few of us.
So call me "shrill." I'll bear it happily. ;)
|
|
Largo
Sport climber
The Big Wide Open Face
|
|
|
Topic Author's Reply - Apr 9, 2015 - 12:06pm PT
|
Ed: We may experience a phenomenon, and it is "subjective" but upon communicating that experience with others and learning about their "subjective" experience, find that there are common aspects that are not dependent on our individual experience, the phenomenon then becomes "objective."
This is a lucid and very workable model if your goal is seeking those universal "common aspects" that can be defined independent of any specific individual, and yet still apply to all people "of sound mind and body," i.e., for those without pathologies.
However, the objectification or discursive process is greater and more far-reaching than seeking universals, and happens whenever we start objectifying any aspect of our experience by way of assigning language, numbers, etc. This process essentially externalizes experiential content, or the mechanisms of consciousness (like awareness, focus, attention, etc.), which otherwise remain subjective.
Of course our objectifications do not mean that our words and definitions and numbers ARE themselves the people, places, things and phenomenon they describe. The accuracy of our models is often based on predicting what will occur when a given kind of tasking is in play, or on the material brain function related to that tasking (so-called "objective functioning," like memory, sight and so forth).
Where the process gets slippery for most of us is when we shift focus from content to sentience itself, and try and objectify that - perhaps, down the road, into some "thing" or function that we can program into an AI array. We cannot objectify our own sentience for obvious reasons. We cannot, as the saying goes, look at our own face. That is, we cannot escape our sentience, or clone it into serial, independent agencies in order to see it "out there," as an object. And such talk as, "sentience is what the brain does" serves no practical purpose to the AI engineer seekignto know what sentience is, how is works, and what the hell it IS in order to render it into the service of AI. Some say that sentience is strictly an "inside" game.
People who can objectify things about us, stuff this is lost on our own point of view, are handy to have around being that we are all full of blind spots. That's why, in my experience, the experiential adventures are usually aided by having credible teachers on hand.
JL
|
|
healyje
Trad climber
Portland, Oregon
|
|
"Pathologies" - what an odd concept for panpsychic; would that be like some sort of antenna misalignment? And would these 'pathologies' be as universal as consciousness?
|
|
WBraun
climber
|
|
Matter has no brain!
|
|
tolman_paul
Trad climber
Anchorage, AK
|
|
How do you mean? Are you saying that we have free will?
What I'm referring to is studies where it has been found that in children how they use their brain and what they are exposed to, i.e. reading books vs. watching television has a physical impact on how the brain wires itself. I have to believe that occurs throughout our life but to a lesser degree as we age.
I do believe we have free will, but that is not related to what I was trying to convey in my previous post.
I see the hardware/software paradigm for brain/mind as much to simplistic.
The mind is an amazing and beuatiful thing. So much more so as we can't see it, yet it is necessary for us to see, and think. And our ability to convey the thoughts of the mind are limited both by our language, and art and how each and every one of our minds has it's own concept of the meaning of a word, or image or phrase.
|
|
|
SuperTopo on the Web
|
Let us know!