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bluering
Trad climber
Santa Clara, Ca.
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Afghanistan's problem lies within Pakistan. The Pakistani gov't has left it's FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) so lawless that it's a cancer that has spread into Afghanistan. It's been that way for a while too. Prior to 9/11.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUAPXe0Hq0Y&feature=player_embedded
The Taliban are largely Pakistani. For the past 2 years the Pak army has been cleaning house though. No doubt, resulting from our pressure and because the Taliban made the mistake of attacking the Pak gov't.
The Pak army responded by opening a major can of whoop-ass on the entire FATA. The places that the dude is talking about in the video are in North/South Waziristan areas. The Southern portion is clear. The North, still drone strikes every couple of days. Orakzai is another problem. All the Talibunnies are fleeing North as the Army chases.
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tuolumne_tradster
Trad climber
Leading Edge of North American Plate
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For an excellent book on the relationship between the Taliban (mainly Pashtuns) and Pakistan's intelligence services (ISI) up to Sept 11, 2001, check out Steve Cull's "Ghost Wars"
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Urmas
Social climber
Sierra Eastside
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During the Viet Nam war there was an expression that applies to the concept stated above that a country can be invaded with the purpose of establishing democracy there:
"We had to destroy that village in order to save it"!!
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Reilly
Mountain climber
The Other Monrovia- CA
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The Taliban are largely Pakistani
Huh? Didn't you mean Pashtun?
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HighDesertDJ
Trad climber
Arid-zona
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Aug 24, 2010 - 08:18pm PT
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Do you realize you are literally thanking socialists in this thread and damning them as clandestine sleeper agents bent on destroying America in another?
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bluering
Trad climber
Santa Clara, CA
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Aug 24, 2010 - 08:43pm PT
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Yeah, but you gotta admit those Canadian troopers are good. That's all that matters to me. They aren't pink(o) on the inside....
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HighDesertDJ
Trad climber
Arid-zona
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Aug 24, 2010 - 08:47pm PT
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Cripes.
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TGT
Social climber
So Cal
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Topic Author's Reply - Oct 1, 2010 - 10:22pm PT
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Not quite, but next door
C17 at Skardu
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Reilly
Mountain climber
The Other Monrovia- CA
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Dec 16, 2010 - 12:51pm PT
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TGT, How 'bout resizing (900 x 600) that good but monstrous shot? It screws up everything!
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Reilly
Mountain climber
The Other Monrovia- CA
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Dec 16, 2010 - 12:59pm PT
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A balanced analysis in today's LA Times:
Winning in Afghanistan
By Peter Mansoor and Max Boot
December 16, 2010
The Obama administration's Afghanistan assessment, due out Thursday,
reportedly indicates uneven but real progress. Fed a steady diet of gloom and doom,
including Wednesday's headlines about negative intelligence
assessments, many Americans will be surprised at this finding.
But in any far-off guerrilla war, perception back home often lags
battlefield reality by several months. It certainly did in Iraq during
the "surge" in 2007. So too in Afghanistan, where the buildup of U.S.
forces, completed only this fall, is already having a considerable
impact, although public opinion hasn't caught on yet.
Even with the recent increase in U.S. troops, bringing the NATO force to
140,000, there are not enough forces to conduct a comprehensive campaign
across the entire country. Heavy-lift helicopters to ferry soldiers into
the high mountains are in especially short supply. Therefore Army Gen.
David H. Petraeus has focused efforts on two southern provinces, Helmand
and Kandahar, where the Taliban has been strongest.
During a recent 10-day visit at his invitation, we found a classic, and
successful, counterinsurgency campaign being conducted in the south. We
drove around Kandahar city and saw markets flourishing. Children who once
threw stones at American vehicles now wave at our soldiers. As we went
north into the Arghandab River Valley — a Taliban stronghold until a few
months ago — we found numerous American and Afghan outposts and soldiers
patrolling on foot between them.
We spoke with one company commander who had just returned from a nighttime
air assault to secure a village. But Arghandab is growing more secure,
and officers are spending more time on governance. Everywhere we went,
the message was the same: The Taliban was surprised by the capabilities
and ferocity of U.S. forces, and it has largely retreated to regroup.
To be sure, fighting normally slackens in the winter; the extent of recent
gains won't be clear until the spring. But when the Taliban returns, it
will find many of its old stomping grounds fortified to resist incursions.
Coalition operations have cleared most insurgents not only from Arghandab
but also from the nearby districts of Panjwai and Zheray. Similar
progress is evident in the central Helmand River Valley in districts such
as Nawa, Garmsir and Marja. They are now entering the "hold and build"
phase of Petraeus' plan. Next year, the intention is to join the
cleared "oil spots" — territory taken from insurgents — in Kandahar and
Helmand, creating a broad swath of liberated territory in the Taliban heartland.
In these operations, U.S. troops are increasingly supported by Afghan
forces. The Afghan army is fighting hard and earning the respect of the
people. The Afghan police force isn't as far along. Many officers are
still corrupt and ineffectual; others are on the right track, with the
help of coalition mentors. One of the most promising developments is the
Afghan Local Police — armed neighborhood watch organizations that are
monitored by Afghan officials and mentored by U.S. troops. This program
has the potential to significantly accelerate the growth of the security
forces and to spread them to areas where coalition forces are thin.
All of these efforts have been helped by the decision at NATO's Lisbon
summit last month to set the end of 2014 as the deadline for the
transition of security responsibility to Afghan control. Afghan officials
who only a few months ago were fretting that President Obama would pull
out in 2011 are now optimistic that we'll stick around. The new timeline
has even made President Hamid Karzai more accommodating, as evidenced by
his restraint over the WikiLeaks revelations.
Two Achilles' heels could still hamper coalition attempts to translate
tactical accomplishments into lasting strategic success: lack of good
governance in Afghanistan and the presence of Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan.
To address the former problem, Petraeus has created a task force,
Shafafiat ("Transparency")under the capable leadership of Army Brig. Gen.
H.R. McMaster to ferret out corruption. The recent decision to bar a
trucking firm partly owned by Ahmad Wali Karzai, the president's
allegedly corrupt brother, from bidding on coalition contracts signals
the seriousness of this effort.
Even greater strides are being made at the local level. We found that
wherever a strong governor, police chief and intelligence chief are
present in a district, progress is being made. In Kabul, two state
organizations, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance and the
Civil Service Institute, are working to seed more competent officials across the country.
The existence of insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan is harder to address.
We will be unable to persuade Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence
agency, which sponsors the Taliban and the Haqqani network, to break
ranks with the insurgents in the near term. Instead, we should strive to
make the sanctuaries less relevant by solidifying security and governance
in Afghanistan. Stabilizing Afghanistan may very well prod Pakistan to
cut loose its proxies as a bad bet. In this regard, too, the 2014
deadline is crucial because it shows our staying power to Islamabad.
Whatever the gains in Kandahar and Helmand, there will be no immediate
lessening of the violence. Tough fighting is virtually assured next
summer as the Taliban tries to claw its way back into these provinces. If
it is repulsed, NATO forces will be able to extend the "oil spot" north and east.
But though overall statistics for violence are likely to remain high, we
should see a drop-off in key districts containing the majority of the
Afghan population. Eventually, once the Taliban is convinced it can't
win, expect to see significant defections from its ranks.
It will require continued patience and sacrifice, but this is a war that
we must, and can, win.
Peter Mansoor, a retired Army colonel who served two combat tours in Iraq,
is a professor of military history at the Ohio State University.
Max Boot is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Copyright © 2010, Los Angeles Times
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