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Matt
Trad climber
never ever pissing into the wind
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Topic Author's Reply - Sep 13, 2007 - 07:55pm PT
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turd-
from what i have read and heard about the guy, he is the so-called 'counter insurgency expert' because he wrote a thesis on the subject, but he had never been deployed in combat before this travesty of a war, and now just a couple years later, he runs the show. he has been musical-chaired all the way to the top, despite the fact that he has been responsible for some huge screw-ups.
did you read the link at the top of the thread?
why do you think his boss sees him that way?
all he can do is his best to support the flawed policy, i do undestand that much, but he signed on to be an integral part of selling this war to the public, and there is no way he was given that assignment w/out agreeing to it in advance.
most of his carrer he has been an academic, a desk jockey, and an assistant to this 4 star or that 4 star.
it should tell you something about the opinions of other generals if such an inexperienced general is/was given the command- what do you think is/was the honest assessment of other generals when bush blamed tommy franks for the failure to secure iraq after the invasion ("it was tommy franks' war plan")? keep in mind, it was donald rumsfeld's wet dream to prove that such a war could be fought and won w/ modern air power (shock and awe, baby!) and relatively few troops on the ground, rumsfeld who was so interested in transforming the army, and all the generals apparently hated the guy, and he was widely know to have been an as#@&%e to them- he was not well liked in the pentagon.
so bush was MIA in vietnam, then he let rummy do whatever he wanted in the pentagon, then they set collin powell up by making him the scapegoat for selling the fake WMD intel in front of the UN, then when their little iraq party goes south bush throws tommy franks under the bus, plus the bush administration dismisses the geneva conventions and the CIA gets a bunch of kids under the command of reserve officers at abu grahib to soften up prisoners for them, and suddenly the whole army's reputation is forever tarnished-
...and then a carrer assistant to other generals gets his first command and low and behold, his academic ideas are the basis of the president's new strategy?
now, do you really think the guy who called him an "ass kissing little chickenshit" wasn't talking about all of that? because i suspect he was talking about all of that, but what do i know, seems like these generals don't feel like they can speak their minds until the retire, so maybe in 10 or 20 years we will know more.
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turd
climber
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Sep 13, 2007 - 07:56pm PT
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OK, fair enough.
Now here are some facts.
If an Army officer is going to see combat, that will almost certainly happen between the time that he is a 2nd Lt (right after commissioning) until he is a Lt Col. After that, the chances of seeing direct combat diminish exponentially with every promotion. That's a general statement (no pun intended), and it varies depending on the career field, but it's a pretty good rule of thumb.
From the time this guy was commissioned until the time he made Lt Col, (1974-1991) he had 11 duty assignments. 6 of those were either direct combat billets, or combat support. All of them were deployable, and all of them were leadership positions (Ops O, Company Commander, etc.) in Mechanized Infantry, Light Infantry, etc.
Now, quick: Name all the combat operations between 1974 and 1991 that this guy could have gotten to to gain combat experience.
P.S. I'll concede that he didn't do Desert Storm (all 1 month of it). Then again, I have a lot of friends that were in combat units at the time (he wasn't) that didn't go.
P.P.S. (?) Matt: From what I know of Adm. Fallon, if Petraeus pissed him off, that doesn't make him a unique species. As to the rest of it, I'll get there. Stick with me.
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Nefarius
Big Wall climber
Fresno, CA
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Sep 13, 2007 - 08:00pm PT
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In general (pardon the pun), don't you have to be an ass-kissing chickenshit to become a general? Certainly in this day and age, anyhow. I think the days of guys like Patton and MacArthur are long over.
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nature
climber
Flagstaff, AZ
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Sep 13, 2007 - 08:02pm PT
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Earth to Matt, come in Matt. Skipped right over the second post in this thread, did ya?
C'mon teammate! Gimme some love!
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turd
climber
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Sep 13, 2007 - 08:07pm PT
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Nefarius -
If you want, I'll tell you what I think about that in a minute too. We probably aren't as far apart on it as you might think.
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Nefarius
Big Wall climber
Fresno, CA
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Sep 13, 2007 - 08:12pm PT
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Sure! I'm always open to hearing what people think on interesting matters.
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turd
climber
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Sep 13, 2007 - 08:16pm PT
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A.C. -
And I won't try to dissuade you from that opinion.
Here is mine. You can call the guy whatever else you want, but you can't call him a chickensh#t, as least not based on his service record. He was available to go to war for a large portion of his career (more than can be said for many others) and he is in fact over there right now, at the age of 53 or whatever. It's not exactly the same as running off to Canada.
And that's all I have to say about that.
Now we can all join hands while you guys kick my ass on my political views and my opinions about the war. But you might be surprised.
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TGT
Social climber
So Cal
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Sep 13, 2007 - 08:29pm PT
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So your original report is
Someone told someone,
That someone told them
that someone's boss
said something unkind about them once.
I'm calling bulshit on this one!
From your miserable excuse for a "news" story, verbatum.
"according to Pentagon sources familiar with reports of the meeting."
In other words third hand at best case.
Since you can't refute the facts, assasinate the character of the messenger.
He's got the goods,
"As battalion commander of the Iron Rakkasans, he suffered one of the more dramatic incidents in his career when, in 1991, he was accidentally shot in the chest during a live-fire exercise when a soldier tripped and his rifle discharged. He was taken to Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Nashville, Tennessee, where he was operated on by future Senator Bill Frist. The hospital released him early after he did fifty push ups without resting, just a few days after the accident. [8][9]"
He refused to persue disciplinary action sgainst the private even under heavy pressure to do so.
"2003, Petraeus, then a major general, commanded the 101st Airborne Division during V Corps's drive to Baghdad. In a campaign chronicled in detail by Rick Atkinson of the Washington Post's book In the Company of Soldiers, Petraeus led his division through the battles of Karbala, Hilla, and Najaf (where he came under fire during an ambush by Iraqi paramilitary forces). The 101st was not, as had been expected, called upon to lead urban combat in Baghdad, leading to some limited criticism of the division's role in the campaign. Instead, as V Corps's lines of supply came under threat from attacks by irregular forces in the cities of the Euphrates river valley, the division's three brigades, reinforced by an armored battalion, took the lead in clearing the cities of Najaf, Karbala, and Hilla. Other notable roles filled by the 101st during the campaign included an armed feint toward Hilla to cover the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized)'s drive through the Karbala Gap, an armed reconnaissance by the division's brigade of Apache attack helicopters, and the relief of beleaguered elements of the 75th Ranger Regiment at the Haditha Dam. Following the fall of Baghdad, the division conducted the longest heliborne assault on record in order to reach Nineveh Province, where it would spend much of the next year (the 1st Brigade was responsible for the area south of Mosul, the 2nd Brigade for the city itself, and the 3rd Brigade for the region stretching toward the Syrian border).
An often-repeated story of Petraeus's time with the 101st is his habit of asking embedded reporters to "Tell me where this ends," an anecdote many journalists have used to portray Petraeus as an early recognizer of the difficulties that would follow the fall of Baghdad. Indeed, it was during the year after the invasion that Petraeus and the 101st gained fame for their performance in Iraq, not for the combat operations in Karbala and Najaf but for the rebuilding and administration of Mosul and Nineveh Province. Described by one former subordinate as "the most competitive man on earth," and by another as "phenomenal at getting people to reach their potential"; these two traits of intensity and cultivation of subordinate officers have widely been reported as key to his success in Mosul. Petraeus oversaw a program of public works projects and political reinvigoration that made the city one of the most peaceful in Iraq during the first year of the war. (One of Petraeus' catch phrases during this period was, "Money is ammunition," supporting the use of commanders' discretionary funds for public works.)[9] One of his major public works was the restoration and re-opening of the University of Mosul. During 2004, after the 101st replacement by I Corps's Task Force Olympia, Mosul became a major battleground in the fight against the Sunni insurgency that erupted that spring. Petraeus and his supporters point to the assassination of the governor of Nineveh the following July, five months after the 101st departed, as the catalyst for the 2004 violence, not the unit's redeployment."
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turd
climber
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Sep 13, 2007 - 08:34pm PT
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Matt:
One other thing to add. I meant to do it earlier, but A.C. suddenly stopped talking and it threw me off.
There are a lot of guys that entered the service around the same time as Petraeus that have about about the same combat record, for the same reason. No combat to go to. The 80's was a slow decade.
So now, what to do? The young officers that are building combat experience right now won't be general officers for another 10-20 years. Either we involuntarily extend Gen. Scharzkopf until age 90, or put what we think is the best of our combat-deprived current crop in charge.
One thing I do know is that the guys he commands think a hell of a lot of him, and that says something right there.
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stevep
Boulder climber
Salt Lake, UT
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Sep 13, 2007 - 08:37pm PT
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I'd like him to be more candid about what happens if there is no political progress in Iraq. But it's not really his job to speak to that. To the extent that was neglected in the hearings, I'd blame weak questions, and Crocker, not Petraeus.
Again, on a strictly tactical level, his tactics, and the "surge" may be having some positive effects. He's not lying about that. And had we been using those tactics from the beginning of the war, we might be in better shape now.
Many of the guys with your so-called combat experience screwed up a lot worse than Petraeus.
I don't get it. They finally bring someone in that's a lot smarter than the yahoos that got us into this mess and you're criticizing him for being smarter?
And let's be clear, the fact that I don't think Petraeus is as bad as Rumsfeld or Franks doesn't mean that I think this war was a good idea, or that the surge has any likelihood of fixing the larger issues, or that we shouldn't start getting troops out now.
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Matt
Trad climber
never ever pissing into the wind
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Topic Author's Reply - Sep 13, 2007 - 09:01pm PT
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i think a numbr of people never actually READ this:
WASHINGTON, Sep 12 (IPS) - In sharp contrast to the lionisation of Gen. David Petraeus by members of the U.S. Congress during his testimony this week, Petraeus's superior, Admiral William Fallon, chief of the Central Command (CENTCOM), derided Petraeus as a sycophant during their first meeting in Baghdad last March, according to Pentagon sources familiar with reports of the meeting.
Fallon told Petraeus that he considered him to be "an ass-kissing little chickenshit" and added, "I hate people like that", the sources say. That remark reportedly came after Petraeus began the meeting by making remarks that Fallon interpreted as trying to ingratiate himself with a superior.
That extraordinarily contentious start of Fallon's mission to Baghdad led to more meetings marked by acute tension between the two commanders. Fallon went on develop his own alternative to Petraeus's recommendation for continued high levels of U.S. troops in Iraq during the summer.
The enmity between the two commanders became public knowledge when the Washington Post reported Sep. 9 on intense conflict within the administration over Iraq. The story quoted a senior official as saying that referring to "bad relations" between them is "the understatement of the century".
Fallon's derision toward Petraeus reflected both the CENTCOM commander's personal distaste for Petraeus's style of operating and their fundamental policy differences over Iraq, according to the sources.
The policy context of Fallon's extraordinarily abrasive treatment of his subordinate was Petraeus's agreement in February to serve as front man for the George W. Bush administration's effort to sell its policy of increasing U.S. troop strength in Iraq to Congress.
In a highly unusual political role for an officer who had not yet taken command of a war, Petraeus was installed in the office of Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, a Republican from Kentucky, in early February just before the Senate debated Bush's troop increase. According to a report in The Washington Post Feb. 7, senators were then approached on the floor and invited to go McConnell's office to hear Petraeus make the case for the surge policy.
Fallon was strongly opposed to Petraeus's role as pitch man for the surge policy in Iraq adopted by Bush in December as putting his own interests ahead of a sound military posture in the Middle East and Southwest Asia -- the area for which Fallon's CENTCOM is responsible.
The CENTCOM commander believed the United States should be withdrawing troops from Iraq urgently, largely because he saw greater dangers elsewhere in the region. "He is very focused on Pakistan," said a source familiar with Fallon's thinking, "and trying to maintain a difficult status quo with Iran."
By the time Fallon took command of CENTCOM in March, Pakistan had become the main safe haven for Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda to plan and carry out its worldwide operations, as well as being an extremely unstable state with both nuclear weapons and the world's largest population of Islamic extremists.
Plans for continued high troop levels in Iraq would leave no troops available for other contingencies in the region.
Fallon was reported by the New York Times to have been determined to achieve results "as soon as possible". The notion of a long war, in contrast, seemed to connote an extended conflict in which Iraq was but a chapter.
Fallon also expressed great scepticism about the basic assumption underlying the surge strategy, which was that it could pave the way for political reconciliation in Iraq. In the lead story Sep. 9, The Washington Post quoted a "senior administration official" as saying that Fallon had been "saying from Day One, 'This isn't working.' "
One of Fallon's first moves upon taking command of CENTCOM was to order his subordinates to avoid the term "long war" -- a phrase Bush and Secretary of Defence Robert M. Gates had used to describe the fight against terrorism.
Fallon was signaling his unhappiness with the policy of U.S. occupation of Iraq for an indeterminate period. Military sources explained that Fallon was concerned that the concept of a long war would alienate Middle East publics by suggesting that U.S. troops would remain in the region indefinitely.
During the summer, according to the Post Sep. 9 report, Fallon began to develop his own plans for redefine the U.S. mission in Iraq, including a plan for withdrawal of three-quarters of the U.S. troop strength by the end of 2009.
The conflict between Fallon and Petraeus over Iraq came to a head in early September. According to the Post story, Fallon expressed views on Iraq that were sharply at odds with those of Petraeus in a three-way conversation with Bush on Iraq the previous weekend. Petraeus argued for keeping as many troops in Iraq for as long as possible to cement any security progress, but Fallon argued that a strategic withdrawal from Iraq was necessary to have sufficient forces to deal with other potential threats in the region.
Fallon's presentation to Bush of the case against Petraeus's recommendation for keeping troop levels in Iraq at the highest possible level just before Petraeus was to go public with his recommendations was another sign that Petraeus's role as chief spokesperson for the surge policy has created a deep rift between him and the nation's highest military leaders. Bush presumably would not have chosen to invite an opponent of the surge policy to make such a presentation without lobbying by the top brass.
Fallon had a "visceral distaste" for what he regarded as Petraeus's sycophantic behaviour in general, which had deeper institutional roots, according to a military source familiar with his thinking.
Fallon is a veteran of 35 years in the Navy, operating in an institutional culture in which an officer is expected to make enemies in the process of advancement. "If you are Navy captain and don't have two or three enemies, you're not doing your job," says the source.
Fallon acquired a reputation for a willingness to stand up to powerful figures during his tenure as commander in chief of the Pacific Command from February 2005 to March 2007. He pushed hard for a conciliatory line toward and China, which put him in conflict with senior military and civilian officials with a vested interest in pointing to China as a future rival and threat.
He demonstrated his independence from the White House when he refused in February to go along with a proposal to send a third naval carrier task force to the Persian Gulf, as reported by IPS in May. Fallon questioned the military necessity for the move, which would have signaled to Iran a readiness to go to war. Fallon also privately vowed that there would be no war against Iran on his watch, implying that he would quit rather than accept such a policy.
A crucial element of Petraeus's path of advancement in the Army, on the other hand, was through serving as an aide to senior generals. He was assistant executive officer to the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Carl Vuono, and later executive assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Henry Shelton. His experience taught him that cultivating senior officers is the key to success.
The contrasting styles of the two men converged with their conflict over Iraq to produce one of the most intense clashes between U.S. military leaders in recent history.
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Karl Baba
Trad climber
Yosemite, Ca
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Sep 13, 2007 - 09:27pm PT
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When a war, it's commander, and it's sale to the public are all lies and spin, we must give them no quarter or benefit of the doubt. They are just trying to buy time with anything we will swallow.
The joke is that Bush says he is merely soliciting and following the advice of his commanders. If you believe that, you're a sucker. They can Generals who don't say what they want to hear.
The stupid surge is hardly doing anything but bringing Iraq back from record extreme violence to the second worst level of violence recorded last year. Big deal. Much of the reduction is due to the fact that Bagdad is now largely ethically cleansed already so there are few Sunnis left to kill and they walled them off.
Why is the only alternatives "cut and run" and "More of the same?" I say divide the country into three, and we move in with our Kurdish friends who won't kill us and we'll help them protect their ample oil.
Peace
Karl
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Matt
Trad climber
never ever pissing into the wind
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Topic Author's Reply - Sep 13, 2007 - 10:05pm PT
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good post karl-
but even more to the point:
we had X amout of success in iraq w/ 132K troops, and there was Y amount of violence.
then w/ 168K, we had X+? success in iraq and there was y-? amount of violence.
in either case, who is going to define what is enough, or what is worthwhile? the bush administration had lied, misled, or been flat wrong at every turn, and at EVERY MOMENT during the ar, they have been pointing to their successes as evidence that we were n some threshold, at some new bring of turning some fateful corner.
petraeus was the official bushco mouthpiece for the advancement of his own academic theories before he was even in the position to test them out. where was the testimony of the acting commanders?
we have seen the hotspots and the problem areas move and change constantly. benchmarks were set several months ago in order to be able to measure success, and by that measure, there has not been success.
they point to anbar to claim success, but of course they are teaming up w/ sunis in anbar and giving them money and weapons and promises of more to come, in order to claim success against AQ. all they are doing there is angering the shiites while they say they are seeking reconciliation, while the shiites see the suni power play for what it is- the sunis are using the US because it suits them for now to do so- so what.
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stevep
Boulder climber
Salt Lake, UT
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Sep 13, 2007 - 10:14pm PT
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1. Matt, if Fallon is such a paragon of militaristic virtue why doesn't he speak out publicly and/or resign like Zinni and Shinseki. That would be a pretty big positive statement. He could even support Obama, as Obama's position is withdraw from Iraq and send more troops to Afghanistan (note that I support this and Obama generally).
2. If I'm Petraeus, accepting the lead position in Iraq doesn't have too much of a downside. History is going to realize that things are so FUBAR by this point, they could have brought in a joint team of Patton, Rommel, Clausewitz and Sun-Tzu and it wouldn't have fixed things. On the other hand, this gives Petraeus a chance to really put into practice all these things he's been preaching about..even if this doesn't fix things politicallly, he gets to find out if his ideas work tactically.
3. Bush obviously likes this too. He gets to go on TV tonite and claim he's withdrawing troops because things are getting better. Ignoring the fact that he would have had to withdraw troops anyway next spring as no troops are left in the hopper with tours ending and no draft or other redeployment possible.
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Matt
Trad climber
never ever pissing into the wind
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Topic Author's Reply - Sep 13, 2007 - 11:04pm PT
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steve-
there is talk that fallon is preparing a report to counter petraeus' testimony, and that he may be called to testify to the senate. could be just talk, we will see.
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mcKbill
climber
Cedar Rapids, Iowa
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Sep 14, 2007 - 11:38pm PT
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Isn't it strange that his name sounds like 'Betray Us'?
Maybe it's not so strange after all.
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Matt
Trad climber
never ever pissing into the wind
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Topic Author's Reply - Sep 17, 2007 - 03:24pm PT
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from fattrad's link
(what a great photo)
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UncleDoug
Social climber
N. lake Tahoe
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Sep 17, 2007 - 03:32pm PT
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"All this bickering about Iraq, when Iran is about ready to go"....
...and create 65,397,521 radicalized muslims.
65,397,521 more than we would have if we do not bomb iran.
They are years from "a bomb".
On the day they test one, you may be able to convince me.
But until then you truly are playing with fire, literally and figuratively.
Be sure to look at the supposed "unintended consequences". China and Russia would not look favorably on this, at all....
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