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Larry Nelson
Social climber
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Jun 19, 2018 - 02:01pm PT
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HFCS
Thanks for the kickstart.
Jan,
Just came across an interview with Freeman Dyson and he touched on Kimura's theory of evolution which I had never heard of. Interesting concept:
The limits are you need big populations in order for selection to be dominant. If you have small populations, then random drift is actually more important than selection. That’s the Kimura theory. Kimura called it the neutral theory of evolution and he wrote a book about it which was widely ignored by all the orthodox biologists.
https://www.52-insights.com/freeman-dyson-i-kept-quiet-for-30-years-so-maybe-its-time-to-speak-interview-science/
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MikeL
Social climber
Southern Arizona
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Jun 19, 2018 - 06:38pm PT
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HFCS: Not for the faint of heart. Stunning, shocking if not destabilizing.
Ha-ha.
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MikeL
Social climber
Southern Arizona
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Jun 19, 2018 - 06:41pm PT
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Larry Nelson: What is reality?
You can look for yourself. I don't know what your background is, but seeing for yourself doesn't take any degrees or books to read. Reality is always right in front of you. You ARE it.
It can help to have discipline in the matter of observation.
Perhaps you want the cliff notes?
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madbolter1
Big Wall climber
Denver, CO
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Jun 19, 2018 - 06:46pm PT
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The problem with embracing the rationalist as opposed to the empiricist side of the major philosophic divide is that you give up any hope of independent refereeing. Once you give up empiricism, anyone can start invoking "special insight" and such as "evidence" for their position.
I think that that's a reasonable summary. That is why Kant called his critical masterpiece "The Critique of Pure Reason [rationalism]" and said that (the empiricist) Hume had awakened him from his "dogmatic [rationalist] slumber."
However, as I've argued elsewhere on related threads, empiricism doesn't get you the "objective refereeing" you think you're getting.
Pure rationalism is akin to pure empiricism in that both promise what they cannot deliver: Objectivism.
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MH2
Boulder climber
Andy Cairns
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Jun 19, 2018 - 08:58pm PT
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Good stuff
My mother earned a little money correcting student essays from our Springville, NY High School.
I see a similarity between the wonderful mis-statements of the students and MikeL's world of subjective reality.
He would agree that it is all part of mind.
As he says:
Reality is always right in front of you. You ARE it.
Who is to say who is crazy? You are.
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Peter Green
Mountain climber
Davis, CA
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Jun 19, 2018 - 09:33pm PT
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Mind is what makes us wonder, recognize greed, ask questions, and keep discussing good questions at great length.
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MikeL
Social climber
Southern Arizona
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Jun 20, 2018 - 07:10am PT
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“Independent refereeing” needs looking into. There would be many reasons why independent refereeing might not be possible. Perhaps we should just say that it’s an ideal. Practically, one could ask any academic who has ever submitted a paper for review. As MB1’s statement might imply, the independence of a referee will not lead to incontrovertible objects.
Jim,
I like your writing of “current” lives when talking about electrical engineers and shocks. Did you intend the pun? :-)
“Shocks” seem to be when the train of our lives runs off the rails. There seems to be nothing better to our awareness of consciousness than when our souls force us out of our comfortable ruts. In certain rather old spiritual traditions, there were practices that were meant to throw a mind out of its zone of comfort by aggressively confronting the social norms of thought, beliefs, and values. The practices were “transgressive,” and they “worked” spiritually because the practices would bring to mind, mind. Pema Chodron, a female buddhist abbot in Nova Scotia, refers to that state of mind of mind as groundlessness. When one is groundless, one is in a state of high ambiguity. Uncertainty is one thing, but ambiguity is highly disorienting in every way. (Radical ambiguity was a core issue in my research studies.)
It’s interesting to me that so many of us want to be radical, revolutionary, to be our own thinkers, to think for ourselves—yet we are one of the pack socially, psychologically, mentally, even spiritually. We can’t help ourselves.
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Ed Hartouni
Trad climber
Livermore, CA
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Jun 20, 2018 - 07:51am PT
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It’s interesting to me that so many of us want to be radical, revolutionary, to be our own thinkers, to think for ourselves—yet we are one of the pack socially, psychologically, mentally, even spiritually. We can’t help ourselves.
self selected here...
...and the zeitgeist, if it is anything, is to draw attention to oneself, in the past (and perhaps right now) one way to do that is to adopt positions that are not conformist.
Yet a major criticism by this crowd of me is my "invariance" (though it has been described as inability) to change my "perspective" from the traditional scientific vantage.
Perhaps some of us can help ourselves...
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yanqui
climber
Balcarce, Argentina
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Jun 20, 2018 - 09:06am PT
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traditional scientific vantage.
An oxymoron?
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eeyonkee
Trad climber
Golden, CO
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Jun 20, 2018 - 09:07am PT
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I think that that's a reasonable summary. Shucks, I'm speechless:)
So, you got me reading up and thinking about this stuff a little more, MB1. In going over the rationalists arguments, it occurs to me that, before genes were understood, people tended to think in terms of just sensory experience vs. intuition/innate knowledge. Now, we have a pretty good explanation of how one might "know" (intuit) something without actually experiencing it. Each of us is born with genetic programming. The programming isn't the experience. It's something different that Descartes and Kant and Hume and the rest could not have foreseen. I'm guessing that if Kant knew this, he might have come to somewhat different conclusions.
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WBraun
climber
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Jun 20, 2018 - 10:56am PT
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It's impossible for the gross materialists to even do independent refereeing because they are not the source of ultimate reality.
This is why the gross materialists are always ultimately clueless and only ever can get limited incomplete knowledge that they masquerade as authoritive and ultimately mislead themselves ......
The gross materialists are defective from the start and are forced to make mistakes!
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MH2
Boulder climber
Andy Cairns
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Jun 20, 2018 - 11:04am PT
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It’s interesting to me that so many of us want to be radical, revolutionary, to be our own thinkers, to think for ourselves—yet we are one of the pack socially, psychologically, mentally, even spiritually. We can’t help ourselves.
There aren't that many paradigm-shifters out there. They exist and all kinds of efforts are made but revolution is hard to bring about.
As seen on 16 June, this thread:
The typical human mind is strongly influenced by prevailing opinion and other social pressures, many of which are subtle and hard to notice, and therefore hard to avoid or resist.
Our susceptibility to social influence is important for our ability to cooperate with each other. It can cause trouble, too.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_influence
Evolutionary biologists have a little to say about variation within a population. There is evidence that black-tailed deer in certain environments have individuals that can roughly (and perhaps anthropomorphically) be characterized as either risk-takers or conservatives.
There may be better foraging in a given niche, but also greater risk of predation.
If every year was the same as the last year, the better survival strategy would eventually dominate and the poorer strategy disappear. But if conditions vary from year to year or season to season, both strategies might be sustained in the long run, keeping the genes promoting them and the divergent tendencies and strategies present in a single species.
It is an hypothesis based on not a lot of evidence, I think, and trying to tease out one or two selective forces from the many operating is hard work.
https://academic.oup.com/biolinnean/article/90/1/125/2706078
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madbolter1
Big Wall climber
Denver, CO
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Jun 20, 2018 - 11:16am PT
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Each of us is born with genetic programming. The programming isn't the experience. It's something different that Descartes and Kant and Hume and the rest could not have foreseen. I'm guessing that if Kant knew this, he might have come to somewhat different conclusions.
Actually, the "programming" to which you seem to be referring is consistent with Kant's perspective, as I understand it. The difficulty, though, in talking about "programming" is that you seem to conflate "knowing" in the sense of something like computer processor microcode with "programming" in the sense of something like a particular program a computer runs.
It's not a very good analogy, as you'll see in a moment, but it's the best I can think of without delving deeply into Kant's actual arguments. The net effect of what I'm saying is that there's a huge difference between "form" and "content," between syntax and semantics.
The computer microcode provides a skeleton of the barest "instructions" to let the computer "know" its "purpose" and establishes the framework within which it can "process" anything. That framework "determines" the "direction" in which a computer can "develop," and it provides the boundaries within which all of its future processing can take place.
By contrast, the "programming" can only "work" if it "aligns" with the microcode appropriately. The computer can only "do" something if its "instructions" cohere with what the microcode can in principle "evaluate." (Sorry, but analogy terms really start to fail here.)
I think, and Kant, I believe, would agree that genetics provides the "programming" of brain structures, central nervous system connections, and so forth. The environment then contributes much to the further development of brain structures and to the "programs" that the organism ultimate runs during the course of its life.
Empiricists believe that that's it: the programming. That's the story, or something like it. All nicely packaged and deterministic.
However, for our purposes, none of that impinges upon Kant's model of "knowing," because ALL of that merely provides PART of the framework of the content of knowing, the empirical part.
But to know anything, even by experience, still requires "microcode," the "structuring" and processing that cannot in principle, according to Kant, BE empirical (in the realm of space/time). That other part, call it the "syntactic" part of "knowing" is not anchored in genetics, nor can it be. In other words, the question emerges: "What IS that microcode and HOW did it come to be what it is?"
The empiricist can deny that there IS any "microcode" in the above sense. And many/most do this very thing. In fact, I'm confident that this would be your response: Why presume "microcode" at all, or why presume that the "microcode" is anything other than "deep" brain structures?
As just one example of an answer to that question, language offers an insight into "what" is happening in our "processor," where that "processor" is not construed as just a brain.
Having studied under some of the top philosophers of language in the world, and having queried them on this point extensively, as well as reading widely on this subject, I think that I can safely say that the "traditional" model of the development of language is dead.
The "traditional" model is that language got built up from simple utterances (the old caveman, "Ugh," cartoons) to the robust, infinitely extensible natural languages we know today. And something very much like that must be the evolutionary model of the development of language, as the model conflates brain structures with syntactic rules. Get a more complex brain, and you get more complex "programming," such is the "genetic" picture.
However, for reasons that are FAR too complex to go into here, I can confidently say that that model is absolutely not what could have happened. Moreover, I can confidently say that empirically-thinking philosophers of language have no idea how language as we know it could have emerged. And that is because language as we know it depends upon semantic structures that could not have emerged piecemeal depending upon ever more complex brains.
Just because we can "deconstruct" the deep-structure of a particular sentence now does not mean that it could have originally been built up from its constituent parts over long spans of time.
There is a vast difference between the simple utterances of, say, chimps or dolphins, and language as we know it; and yet there's no known "pathway" from "there to here." Language as we know it depends upon a panoply of "deep structures" that seem to be "all or nothing." And basic utterances are not "language," any more than disparate notes are music.
So, the best empirical model now is that there is a "threshold" of brain complexity. Once a brain becomes sufficiently complex, "suddenly" language as we know it becomes possible. Below that "threshold" you have at most simple utterances. Above that "threshold" you get genuine "microcode" in the robust sense.
However, there are many problems with this model as well. For one, even individuals with basically no brain at all enjoy linguistic capacities as we know them. On the "other end," animals with apparently more complex brains than ours (dolphins) are quite apparently limited to simple utterances (speculations to the contrary aside).
Worse for the model, it still provides no account of the syntactic/semantic divide. As Frege revealed, "meaning" is neither "sense" nor "reference" in isolation; there is no such thing as THE meaning of a word in isolation. "The" meaning of even a word, much more so a sentence, is a highly contextualized process that depends upon both syntactic and semantic structures. And the empirical account remains anchored in the semantics, leaving the development of syntax (the rules) unaccounted for.
This is complex stuff, but I'll try to pare it down to this: Pointing at something and giving it a name (bare reference) does NOT "build up to" general terms, universal terms, nor their in-principle infinite syntactic context. There MUST be a "microcode" in play, yet the "brain complexity" account of language remains anchored in an appeal to the "programming" that presumes "microcode" without accounting for it.
Every attempt to anchor "microcode" in yet "deeper" brain structures reveals the syntactic/semantic divide rather than explaining it. In other words, Kant's account of the "I think" as an in-principle non-empirical "processor" is the only account of genuine "microcode" I know of. But that's not in-principle anchored in genetics, brain structures, or empirically "built up" language.
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MH2
Boulder climber
Andy Cairns
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Jun 20, 2018 - 02:26pm PT
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I can confidently say that empirically-thinking philosophers of language have no idea how language as we know it could have emerged. And that is because language as we know it depends upon semantic structures that could not have emerged piecemeal depending upon ever more complex brains.
Something like that is also true for the protein/nucleic acid molecules that manage to maintain low entropy environments in our cells. They are so complex individually and their successful function depends on interactions with each other. It is hard to see how the system emerged. But there it is.
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Jan
Mountain climber
Colorado & Nepal
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Jun 20, 2018 - 02:49pm PT
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Very interesting from the philosophical point of view and madbolter may be right, but given the fact that human language seems to be at least 50,000 years old, I doubt we will ever know for sure.
Meanwhile our understanding of whale and dolphin language is still so elementary, I don't think we can make conclusions about that either. Don't forget that no less than Charles Darwin concluded that the Tierra del Fuegians who were being returned to their homeland after being paraded around Europe as exhibits of savage New World primitives, concluded that they had no language, only howls and grunts, yet the Fuegians spoke multiple unrelated languages whose structure is still poorly understood. It strikes me we could be making the same mistake with some animal species.
If you want to propose a microprogram for language that its imprinted on the human brain then it needs to be extended to all the great apes and may reach further back than that. How else to explain that both Chimps and Gorilla's efforts at sign language can surpass that of young human children whether they have been taught through silent sign language only or are bilingual in spoken English and sign language. Indeed, Koko the gorilla has made up simple phrases, conveyed in sign language, that when translated to English actually rhyme.
In fact, spoken language may have been preceded by forms of sign language, vocalizations, dance and music. If one wants to memorize vocabulary lists, making a bodily motion while saying the word out loud, speeds the process. There must be an evolutionary reason for this. Since DNA shows the Bushmen, the Khoisian San people, to be the oldest surviving humans on earth, and their language is an extremely complex mixture of whistles and clicks, one could hypothesize that hunting communication was the main stimulus to language and it started simply.
Then there are the examples of languages that have become simplified in both phonology and grammar over time and that this can be co-related with their physical distance from Africa. Chinese used to be multisyllabic and gradually became monosyllabic with tones. Polynesian languages have simplified over time to have very few different sounds and so repeat the same ones multiple times for meaning, the Hawaiian King Kamehameha's name being one example. The Japanese still write with the complicated Chinese characters because their language has so few separate sounds and thus too many homonyms to be easily understood with either alphabetic or syllabary writing systems.
An anthropologist will always say to be cautious about making conclusions regarding human languages based on what one knows of only one language family such as Indo-Eurppean, which is the language basis of most all of the world's philosophers and linguists so far. I've always thought it a pity that Noam Chomsky, who invented the idea of innate programming for language being universal, and uniquely human, never learned a really different non Indo-European language or spent any time around apes with sign language.
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madbolter1
Big Wall climber
Denver, CO
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Jun 20, 2018 - 02:56pm PT
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It is hard to see how the system emerged. But there it is.
Exactly, so it's deeply question-begging to say "there it is" must be interpreted in evolutionary terms as opposed to acting as an evidence against the evolutionary account.
When some significant subset of "there it is" is not adequately explained by the evolutionary account, that provides reasonable grounds for questioning the evolutionary account rather than just doubling-down on it.
I'll hasten to say that it's a huge mistake made by most (basically all) Christians to say, in effect, "Scientists don't know; therefore God," especially when "God" for them means a heavily doctrinally-laden description.
I guess that this is part of why I say that I'm not a very good Christian. I'm not willing to jump to "therefore God" as an appeal to ignorance. The levels of inference and evidence one must contemplate to both say "therefore God" AND say anything substantive about what "God" entails is absolutely daunting!
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madbolter1
Big Wall climber
Denver, CO
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Jun 20, 2018 - 02:59pm PT
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Good, thoughtful points, Jan. However, there are syntactic features of all known natural languages as far back as we have any record of natural languages, not limited to this or that subset.
All natural languages "sprang into existence" with these features fully formed, and these features presume some fully-formed "microcode" that as yet defies empirical explanation.
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eeyonkee
Trad climber
Golden, CO
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Jun 20, 2018 - 03:28pm PT
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Actually, the "programming" to which you seem to be referring is consistent with Kant's perspective, as I understand it. The difficulty, though, in talking about "programming" is that you seem to conflate "knowing" in the sense of something like computer processor program a computer runs. I must admit, I don’t know that I am following you here; specifically -- you seem to conflate "knowing" in the sense of something like computer processor microcode with "programming" in the sense of something microcode with "programming" in the sense of something like a particular like a particular program a computer runs.
In any case, I would say that the programming that I was referring to works on two different levels; species and individual organism.
At the species level, you and I are essentially identical and distinct from, say chimpanzees. This is because you and I have a “human” ancestry and exist in a common breeding population. We both respond to common events in a way different from other species. It’s clear that we could devise tests that would clearly put you and I in the human group, and Bonzo and Cheetah in another.
At the organism level, you and I are distinct. Because you inherited this one set of genes and I, another, there are outside stimuli that might occur in which you will have a high probability of reacting one way and I another. This is the “intuition” that I was referring to. To you (and I), this feels like intuition.
Empiricists believe that that's it: the programming. That's the story, or something like it. All nicely packaged and deterministic.
Actually, I would say that it is the programming along with the actual playing out of the program on the world stage, which includes other actors along with little bits of randomness (to make things interesting) that gives a better flavor of empiricism.
However, for our purposes, none of that impinges upon Kant's model of "knowing," because ALL of that merely provides PART of the framework of the content of knowing, the empirical part.
But to know anything, even by experience, still requires "microcode," the "structuring" and processing that cannot in principle, according to Kant, BE empirical (in the realm of space/time).
Says who? I don’t believe that you have followed the counter-argument sufficiently here.
That other part, call it the "syntactic" part of "knowing" is not anchored in genetics, nor can it be. In other words, the question emerges: "What IS that microcode and HOW did it come to be what it is?"
It (“microcode”) is genes, period. These genes evolved to be what they are. There is no mystery here.
However, for reasons that are FAR too complex to go into here, I can confidently say that that model is absolutely not what could have happened. Moreover, I can confidently say that empirically-thinking philosophers of language have no idea how language as we know it could have emerged. And that is because language as we know it depends upon semantic structures that could not have emerged piecemeal depending upon ever more complex brains. Hmmm, how about linguists like Steven Pinker rather than philosophers of language?
So, the best empirical model now is that there is a "threshold" of brain complexity. Once a brain becomes sufficiently complex, "suddenly" language as we know it becomes possible. Below that "threshold" you have at most simple utterances. Above that "threshold" you get genuine "microcode" in the robust sense. Again, that might be what you read about in philosophical journals, but I don’t believe that this is the consensus among linguists.
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WBraun
climber
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Jun 20, 2018 - 04:21pm PT
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but given the fact that human language seems to be at least 50,000 years old
Much older ..... millions years old.
Just the Satya yuga alone lasted 1,728,000 years where humanity was at its most intelligent.
Not like the degeneration of this age of Kali the iron age with hypocrisy and quarrel being dominate.
The gross materialists are always in poor fund of knowledge ....
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nafod
Boulder climber
State college
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Jun 20, 2018 - 04:24pm PT
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Madbolter, do you think you could have a mind without language?
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