Huge 8.9 quake plus tsunami - Japan

well we like to flail the inefficient USG for things, but nuclear security has vastly improved since 2005 (and since 2001) at least in part to the findings of such news reports as Karl has posted.

F*#k off idiot.

I am fairly certain that we can all agree that we want reliable, inexpensive electrical power that poses the least impact to human health and the environment. Sounds simple right

Oh please Karl....play patty cake nicy nice on your own time...
What good does it do when people just walk around you and keep in doing it?

This aadam ahole is in charge of inspecting these things? He thinks radiation is not a danger as it relates to cancer because DNA has the ability to fix itself!!
He has all the education of a two week nuclear safety course.


Instead of spending time editing old posts Adam get your dumb ass over there and help
Damn cowards using uneducated migrant workers to do the dirty work...

I wish I could help with this situation- but I can certainty see why is occured from the responses on this thread on both sides.

You know we fired four absolute lunatics this week, 3 nurses and 1 doctor, after over a month of my write ups and we placed their licenses under review, and I will be doing everything I can to stop them from practising.

Adam wouldn't be done wiping nuclear jiz off his chin in the same circumstances..

And you're a liar to boot Adam- I know what you deleted- and I expected it- and it will be posted when I am good and ready.

Oh please Karl....play patty cake nicy nice on your own time...
What good does it do when people just walk around you and keep in doing it?

There is a longer road that takes us to a better place with renewable fuels but we can shorten it dramatically by pouring funding and scale into it.

The unfortunate realities of DC Budget politics these days show a huge uphill battle for the Dept. of Energy to fund this reasearch which would help us acheive these goals. With the Conservative Congress wanting to cut medicare/medicaid/SS I have a hard time believing that the longer term energy needs will be brought forward as an issue. I hate to say it but in my opinion most of the politicians are far shorter sighted than their constituents (liberal or conservative).

And you're a liar to boot Adam- I know what you deleted- and I expected it- and it will be posted when I am good and ready.

I am fairly certain that we can all agree that we want reliable, inexpensive electrical power that poses the least impact to human health and the environment.

For example. let's say a higher level person at the plant develops Schizophrenia or another disorder than causes him to wish to sabotage the plant cause God told him to. How hard would it be for someone with access and knowledge to render the plant into deep trouble (sabotage the control room and backup?)

Some info, you likely won't read, yet addresses everything you are asking about security:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part073/

(B) Active (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack) or passive (e.g., provide information), or both, knowledgeable inside assistance;

Anyway.. I didn't mean to rant so long. I do appreciate your and Adams commentary on this forum. This is a difficult subject and I hope you will forgive me for not exactly trusting everything that comes out of it.

I was actually trying to scare that anonymous hawkeye guy up again.
Anyone figure out who this nitwit is yet??
Is it rradam??
They are about right on integrity- but not really sure about the rest.

Karl- sometimes ya gotta throw down- my attitude,judgment and response to absolute lies, distorted opinions or aggression have been constant over this entire thread.
If TGT, hawkeye or rradam have any credibilty left after 6 weeks of this disaster than this an an utterly hopeless situation.

I am done on this thread because it has been a skipping record for weeks- you can read the same mumbo jumbo from all sides at the bottom of any news article.

And Adam, I know at least three other posters who copied the thread 4 weeks ago- so don't worry, we are gonna have a little rradam, before and after party, on its own thread some day- then again I really don't care what you do- you know I know what you have deleted, and that is all that matters.

But I leave you with the question.
Which is worse: incompetance, impotence, evil, cowardice, or just not giving a sh#t.

cheers but not peace
riley

edit:
""Like I said, Riley... I'm 'all in'. You gonna 'call', or 'fold'.

Huh, bluff??? called?? this is a game to you??
You already lose rradam- you have already been busted. Would be nice to start the "game" over but you have already shown your cards and lost silly boy.


Rubber stamp, industry insider, inspector with out a clue- pretty much the worst piece of garbage there is in this world.

Thanks for the education rradam- you helped turn me from pro-nuclear to seeing this for what it really is....I will use your name and your posts on this thread when donating, giving time and joining groups associated with this very important cause...
game over..

You didn't read it, did you? How do I know? Because if you had, you would see that what you are now asking is specifically addressed by that specific part of the Code of Federal Regulations:

"Six nuclear warheads on cruise missiles were mistakenly carried on a flight from North Dakota to Louisiana last week, prompting a major investigation, military officials have confirmed.

The plane took the cruise missiles from Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base for decommissioning Thursday, the Air Force said.

"This is a major gaffe, and it's going to cause some heads to roll down the line," said Don Shepperd, a retired Air Force major general and military analyst for CNN....Shepperd said the United States had agreed in a Cold War-era treaty not to fly nuclear weapons. "It appears that what happened was this treaty agreement was violated," he said.

The warheads should have been removed from the missiles before they were attached to the B-52 bomber, according to military officials. Watch the report on the military's investigation

The crew was unaware that the plane was carrying nuclear weapons, the officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the extraordinary sensitivity and security surrounding the case.

The mistake was discovered after the plane's flight to Louisiana.....

Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate and Low Strategic Significance

§ 73.67 Licensee fixed site and in-transit requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance.

(a) General performance objectives. (1) Each licensee who possesses, uses or transports special nuclear material of moderate or low strategic significance shall establish and maintain a physical protection system that will achieve the following objectives:

(i) Minimize the possibilities for unauthorized removal of special nuclear material consistent with the potential consequences of such actions; and

(ii) Facilitate the location and recovery of missing special nuclear material.

(2) To achieve these objectives, the physical protection system shall provide:

(i) Early detection and assessment of unauthorized access or activities by an external adversary within the controlled access area containing special nuclear material;

(ii) Early detection of removal of special nuclear material by an external adversary from a controlled access area;

(iii) Assure proper placement and transfer of custody of special nuclear material; and

(iv) Respond to indications of an unauthorized removal of special nuclear material and then notify the appropriate response forces of its removal in order to facilitate its recovery.

(b)(1) A licensee is exempt from the requirements of this section to the extent that he possesses, uses, or transports:

(i) Special nuclear material which is not readily separable from other radioactive material and which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding, or

(ii) Sealed plutonium-beryllium neutron sources totaling 500 grams or less contained plutonium at any one site or contiguous sites, or

(iii) Plutonium with an isotopic concentration exceeding 80 percent in plutonium-238.

(2) A licensee who has quantities of special nuclear material equivalent to special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance distributed over several buildings may, for each building which contains a quantity of special nuclear material less than or equal to a level of special nuclear material of low strategic significance, protect the material in that building under the lower classification physical security requirements.

(c) Each licensee who possesses, uses, transports, or delivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance, or 10 kg or more of special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall:

(1) Submit a security plan or an amended security plan describing how the licensee will comply with all the requirements of paragraphs (d), (e), (f), and (g) of this section, as appropriate, including schedules of implementation. The licensee shall retain a copy of the effective security plan as a record for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license for which the original plan was submitted. Copies of superseded material must be retained for three years after each change.

(2) Within 30 days after the plan submitted pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) of this section is approved, or when specified by the NRC in writing, implement the approved security plan.

(d) Fixed site requirements for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance. Each licensee who possesses, stores, or uses quantities and types of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance at a fixed site or contiguous sites, except as allowed by paragraph (b)(2) of this section and except those who are licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to part 50, shall:

(1) Use the material only within a controlled access area which is illuminated sufficiently to allow detection and surveillance of unauthorized penetration or activities,

(2) Store the material only within a controlled access area such as a vault-type room or approved security cabinet or their equivalent which is illuminated sufficiently to allow detection and surveillance of unauthorized penetration or activities,

(3) Monitor with an intrusion alarm or other device or procedures the controlled access areas to detect unauthorized penetration or activities,

(4) Conduct screening prior to granting an individual unescorted access to the controlled access area where the material is used or stored, in order to obtain information on which to base a decision to permit such access,

(5) Develop and maintain a controlled badging and lock system to identify and limit access to the controlled access areas to authorized individuals,

(6) Limit access to the controlled access areas to authorized or escorted individuals who require such access in order to perform their duties,

(7) Assure that all visitors to the controlled access areas are under the constant escort of an individual who has been authorized access to the area,

(8) Establish a security organization or modify the current security organization to consist of at least one watchman per shift able to assess and respond to any unauthorized penetrations or activities in the controlled access areas,

(9) Provide a communication capability between the security organization and appropriate response force,

(10) Search on a random basis vehicles and packages leaving the controlled access areas, and

(11) Establish and maintain written response procedures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of these materials. The licensee shall retain a copy of the response procedures as a record for the period during which the licensee possesses the appropriate type and quantity of special nuclear material requiring this record under each license for which the original procedures were developed and, for three years thereafter. Copies of superseded material must be retained for three years after each change.

(e) In-transit requirements for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance. (1) Each licensee who transports, exports or delivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shall:

(i) Provide advance notification to the receiver of any planned shipments specifying the mode of transport, estimated time of arrival, location of the nuclear material transfer point, name of carrier and transport identification,

(ii) Receive confirmation from the receiver prior to the commencement of the planned shipment that the receiver will be ready to accept the shipment at the planned time and location and acknowledges the specified mode of transport,

(iii) Check the integrity of the container and locks or seals prior to shipment, and

(iv) Arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the materials in accordance with the requirements of § 73.67(e)(3) unless the receiver is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.

(2) Each licensee who receives special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shall:

THIS YEAR, long after 9-11~!