Discussion Topic |
|
This thread has been locked |
TwistedCrank
climber
Dingleberry Gulch, Ideeho
|
|
It's all wanking until someone puts an eye out.
|
|
guyman
Social climber
Moorpark, CA.
|
|
They will get hundreds of thousands of shots off from heavy artillery.
The barrage will last for hours, if not days.
Those shots will hit US positions and densely-populated areas of Seoul.
We will take out all their guns, eventually...
Dave... you should study up on our Counter Artillery capabilities.
We can get off a shot, while their shell is still on the way, with pin point accuracy. We don't just shoot at rough grid points like the NK can. We shoot at the TUBE itself.
We can tell where the shot is coming from, at the same time we have shells that can fly around and give intell .... thanks to a climber I know who designed and tested those suckers, for the second wave of directed shots.
All the $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ we have spent does give us quite a large edge when it comes to combat.
Just watch some of the vids comming out of Afgan....
And I agree with JL..... they don't have the resources for more than a few seconds of WAR.
I hope someone puts a cap in fat boys ass before this gets any worse.
|
|
survival
Big Wall climber
Terrapin Station
|
|
Asians are locked won. What does that mean John?
Just watch some of the vids comming out of Afgan....
You mean the videos of us defeating a pajama clad army,...again....,in 5 minutes? Yeah, that's the one.
That's why we're still fighting there, twice as long as WWII took.
We're invincible alright.
|
|
guyman
Social climber
Moorpark, CA.
|
|
Many never took seriously the threat from a bunch of "cave dwelling middle easterners". NY will never be the same.
Ron true that....
And remember when that nice Mr. Chamberlin assured the world that Mr. Hitler, the honerable gentleman, has pledged to not have anymore territorial demands.
And recall the sturring words of GWBush...
fool me once, ya fooled me.
fool me again,, dang!
no more, you think I am fool...
sometin like that, er, you know.
|
|
jstan
climber
|
|
Fidel Castro advises friend North Korea against war
12:02pm EDTNorth Korea asks embassies to consider moving diplomats out|
By Jeff Franks
HAVANA | Fri Apr 5, 2013 12:02pm EDT
(Reuters) - Former Cuban leader Fidel Castro warned ally North Korea against war on Friday and described the current tensions on the Korean Peninsula as one of the "gravest risks" for nuclear holocaust since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.
Saying he spoke as a friend, Castro wrote in Cuban state media that North Korea, led by 30-year-old Kim Jong-un, had shown the world its technical prowess and now it was time to remember its duties to others.
North Korea, which along with Cuba is one of the world's last communist countries, has been ratcheting up pressure by declaring war on neighbor South Korea and threatening to stage a nuclear strike on the United States.
Few observers believe it will actually attack anyone, but Castro has become an anti-nuclear advocate in recent years.
"The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was always friendly with Cuba, as Cuba always has been and will continue to be with her," Castro wrote, using an almost paternalistic tone.
"Now that it has demonstrated its technical and scientific advances, we remind it of its duties to other countries who have been great friends and that it would not be just to forget that such a war would affect in a special way more than 70 percent of the world's population," said the 86-year-old, who turned Cuba communist after taking power in a 1959 revolution.
Castro called the present situation on the Korean Peninsula "incredible and absurd," but said "it has to do with one of the gravest risks of nuclear war since the Crisis of October (Cuban Missile Crisis), 50 years ago."
He led Cuba through the October 1962 showdown when the United States and Soviet Union nearly went to war over the placement of Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuba, 90 miles south of Florida.
At one point, Castro wrote a letter to Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev urging a nuclear attack on the United States, which he assumed was about to invade the Caribbean island.
Cooler heads prevailed as Khruschev and President John F. Kennedy reached an agreement in which the Soviet missiles were removed and the United States promised never to invade Cuba.
Castro ruled Cuba for 49 years before age and ill health forced him to step down in 2008.
He was succeeded as president by younger brother Raul Castro, 81, but remains a power behind the scenes and writes occasional columns for Cuban press.
The elder Castro also said the United States had the responsibility to prevent war, which he said if unleashed would make President Barack Obama look like "the most sinister person in the history of the United States."
(Editing by Doina Chiacu)
Thanks only to NK's posture over many years, I think Castro's assessment of the risk is plausible. And due to the corruption of people's minds carried out in NK since the 50's, improvement in the near term is made unlikely.
|
|
Don Paul
Big Wall climber
Colombia, South America
|
|
Werner gets my vote for best post on this subject and american's in general.
Somehow I missed it, normally his comments are the best. The situation is very simple. The North Koreans feel threatened and that their nukes are what's keeping them from ending up like Iraq, Libya, etc. Nothing crazy about it. They would be crazy to disarm. The Chinese are massing troops in the NK border, to defend NK as they are obligated to do by treaty.
|
|
survival
Big Wall climber
Terrapin Station
|
|
Afghanistan is the 10th poorest country in the world.
The only reasons they don't rank higher are 10 years of MASSIVE western aid and the number 1 supply of opium.
Anyway, we haven't defeated the army that everyone hates in 10 years, so we should have no trouble with N. Korea.
Phuk me Alex, sign us up for some more wars.
|
|
guyman
Social climber
Moorpark, CA.
|
|
That's why we're still fighting there, twice as long as WWII took.
We're invincible alright.
The USA, lacks the will to do what we must do to win. Period.
Take that back as far as, the first Korean War right up through today.
And wow I agree with Fidel......
|
|
Gene
climber
|
|
The rhetoric is at historical levels now.. Kim dung-fart breath has made his deceleration of war. That worries me as now he feels the need to prove his flagrant words.
Ron,
When nothing happens, Kim can declare that he intimidated the entire world, declare victory, and have beer and brats with Rodman. That’s been his plan all along.
g
|
|
Jan
Mountain climber
Okinawa, Japan
|
|
One of the reasons the grandson of the dynasty feels free to make threats is because his father and grandfather did, and in return they got food and fuel aid. Personally I think the only way to end this blackmail is to not give in again.
The grandson has backed himself into quite a corner through his inexperience and I think we may well see a military coup against him as a result of this.
|
|
lostinshanghai
Social climber
someplace
|
|
The periodical sums up my opinion if we did go to war with Korea. I said if and think most likely we will not.
You have to realize this is a kid so he has been listening to and learning from the generals of his army, navy, Air Farce? who are the ones in command; the old guard that wants the war. He is in a dilemma of acting tough to the rest of the world and his people thinking that NATO especially the US will make a deal and feed the country get the sanctions off his back which no one will offer. No loosing Face as they say in that part of the world.
China will not get involved, the only way if they do is give him and his family sanctuary as well as the generals that want to live.
That's assuming if he does attack, no nukes but hits the US air base in Japan first [but the planes will be in the air well before it gets hit then the US has the right to act by striking back. No nukes as well. The kid who has no clue since he is too young to comprehend what the US will do. Well he does just like what we did in Libya, and other countries in the Middle East by hitting the command centers so they would have no way to communicate with generals in the field, knock out their electricity as well, As it goes for his superior weaponry he is on the wrong track. No match.
Good write [one opinion] on FOREIGNAFFAIRS this week:
The Next Korean War:
Conflict With North Korea Could Go Nuclear -- But Washington Can Reduce the Risk
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
As North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un issues increasingly over-the-top threats -- including intimations that he might launch nuclear strikes against the United States -- officials in Washington have sought to reassure the public and U.S. allies. North Korea, they say, may initiate cyberattacks or other limited provocations, but the leaders in Pyongyang wish to survive, so they are highly unlikely to do anything as foolhardy as using nuclear weapons.
Despite those assurances, however, the risk of nuclear war with North Korea is far from remote. Although Pyongyang’s tired threats are probably bluster, the current crisis has substantially increased the risk of a conventional conflict -- and any conventional war with North Korea is likely to go nuclear. Washington should continue its efforts to prevent war on the Korean Peninsula. But equally important, it must rapidly take steps -- including re-evaluating U.S. war plans -- to dampen the risks of nuclear escalation if conventional war erupts.
Ironically, the risk of North Korean nuclear war stems not from weakness on the part of the United States and South Korea but from their strength. If war erupted, the North Korean army, short on training and armed with decrepit equipment, would prove no match for the U.S.–South Korean Combined Forces Command. Make no mistake, Seoul would suffer some damage, but a conventional war would be a rout, and CFC forces would quickly cross the border and head north.
At that point, North Korea’s inner circle would face a grave decision: how to avoid the terrible fates of such defeated leaders as Saddam Hussein and Muammar al-Qaddafi. Kim, his family, and his cronies could try to escape to China and plead for a comfortable, lifelong sanctuary there -- an increasingly dim prospect given Beijing’s growing frustration with Kim’s regime. Pyongyang’s only other option would be to try to force a cease-fire by playing its only trump card: nuclear escalation.
It’s impossible to know how exactly Kim might employ his nuclear arsenal to stop the CFC from marching to Pyongyang. But the effectiveness of his strategy would not depend on what North Korea initially destroyed, such as a South Korean port or a U.S. airbase in Japan. The key to coercion is the hostage that is still alive: half a dozen South Korean or Japanese cities, which Kim could threaten to attack unless the CFC accepted a cease-fire.
This strategy, planning to use nuclear escalation to stalemate a militarily superior foe, is not far-fetched. In fact, it was NATO’s strategy for most of the Cold War. Back then, when the alliance felt outgunned by the massive conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact, NATO planned to use nuclear weapons coercively to thwart a major conventional attack. Today, both Pakistan and Russia rely on that same strategy to deal with the overwhelming conventional threats that they face. Experts too easily dismiss the notion that North Korea’s rulers might deliberately escalate a conventional conflict, but if their choice is between escalation and a noose, it is unclear why they would be less ruthless than those who once devised plans to defend NATO.
Even if the United States and South Korea anticipated the danger of marching to Pyongyang and adopted limited objectives in a war, nuclear escalation would still be likely. That’s because the style of conventional war that the United States has mastered over the past two decades is highly escalatory.
The core of U.S. conventional military strategy, refined during recent wars, is to incapacitate the enemy by disabling its central nervous system -- its ability to understand what is happening on the battlefield, make decisions, and control its forces. Against Serbia, Libya, and Iraq (twice), the key targets in the first days of conflict were not enemy tanks, ships, or planes but leadership bunkers, military command sites, and means of communication. This new American way of war has been enormously effective. But if directed against a nuclear-armed opponent, it would pressure the enemy to escalate a conflict.
Preventing escalation in the midst of a war would require convincing North Korea’s leaders that they would survive, and so attacks designed to isolate and blind the regime would be counterproductive. Once airstrikes began pummeling leadership bunkers and severing communication links, the Kim regime would have no way of discerning how minimalist or maximalist the CFC’s objectives were. It would face powerful incentives to make the CFC attacks stop immediately -- a job for which nuclear weapons are well suited.
The sliver of good news is that North Korea may not yet have the capabilities to carry out this strategy. It may not be able to tip its ballistic missiles with a nuclear payload, and its other means of delivering nuclear weapons remain limited. Given the rate of progress, however, if the regime does not have these capabilities today, it will soon.
What can be done? First, Washington and Seoul must make every effort to avoid war in the current crisis. The United States is undoubtedly (and appropriately) quietly reinforcing U.S. forces in the region, and the CFC is understandably considering what red lines might trigger a pre-emptive conventional strike. But the fact that war with North Korea probably means nuclear war should temper any consideration of limited pre-emptive strikes. Pre-emption means war, and war means nuclear.
Second, U.S. and South Korean planners need to develop truly limited conventional military options for the Peninsula -- limited not merely in their objectives but also in terms of the military operations they unleash. Perhaps the greatest danger of all is if the U.S. president and the South Korean president incorrectly believe that they have limited military options available; they and their senior advisers may not fully appreciate that those supposedly limited options in fact entail hundreds of airstrikes against high-value targets, such as leadership, command-and-control systems, and perhaps even against nuclear-weapons sites.
Third, American and South Korean leaders should urge China to develop “golden parachute” plans for the North Korean leadership and their families. Leaders in Pyongyang will keep their nuclear weapons holstered during a war only if they believe that they and their families have a safe and secure future somewhere. In the past, China has been understandably reluctant to hold official talks with the United States about facilitating the demise of its ally. But the prospect of nuclear war next door could induce Beijing to take more direct steps, including preparing an escape plan now and revealing it to Kim as soon as a first shot is fired.
More broadly, the strategic dilemma Washington faces today extends beyond the current standoff with North Korea: how to run a network of global alliances when nuclear weapons allow enemies to nullify the United States’ superior military might. American officials used to extol the ability of nuclear weapons to stalemate powerful enemies. Now the shoe is on the other foot. There is every reason to believe that North Korea has adopted NATO’s old strategy. As the current standoff is making frighteningly clear, deterring escalation, especially during conventional wars, is not last century’s concern; it may be the single toughest strategic problem confronting the United States for decades to come.
Another good read: from CFR [Council of Foreign Affairs]
North Korea's Rhetorical Flurry
Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor
Interviewee: Scott A. Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy
Pyongyang has increased its combative rhetoric in recent days, including threats of preemptive nuclear strikes on the United States and South Korea. Meanwhile, Washington has flexed its military deterrent in the region, with rare stealth bomber sorties and other exercises in South Korea. "The primary danger is really related to the potential for miscalculation between the two sides," says CFR's Korea expert Scott A. Snyder. "And in this kind of atmosphere of tensions, that miscalculation could have deadly consequences." Despite the sabre rattling, Snyder says he is not so concerned about the public threats as much as he is about some guerrilla-type attack by the North.
The North Koreans cut off military communications with the South, and said in a statement that "under this situation where war may break out at any moment," there's no reason to keep in touch. Why is this rhetoric getting so heavy?
First, North Korea is dissatisfied with the condemnation by the UN Security Council that came following its latest nuclear test in February. Secondly, there are regular military exercises that are going on right now in the southern part of the peninsula by the United States and South Korea. These are routine exercises; the North Koreans complain every year, but the decibel level of the complaints and the sorts of actions they have taken this year have gone a lot higher than in the past.
Another factor is that because of concerns in South Korea about the possibility that Pyongyang might be more aggressive, as shown by its nuclear capability, South Koreans are matching North Korea's threats as a way of sending a signal that they won't be subject to nuclear blackmail.
The United States would get directly involved if there was any direct attack, right?
Yes. The State Department essentially said that they see this as part of North Korea's "usual pattern." After North Korea's nuclear test, Washington has been trying to signal deterrence to North Korea while signaling assurance to South Korea. President Obama had a conversation with then-president Lee Myung-bak and underscored U.S. commitments to defend South Korea. There was a speech by the national security adviser, Tom Donilon, which also gave a strong statement of resolve by the United States to defend its allies and its interests. We had Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel making a missile defense announcement in response to North Korea's nuclear test. And we had the Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter passing through South Korea during exercises and in the course of a press interview mentioning that B-52s had also been part of the exercise--signaling to the North Koreans that the U.S. had a nuclear response as an option.
Has the overflight of South Korea by U.S. B-2 bombers unnerved the North Koreans?
The overflight has gotten North Korea's attention, as evidenced by the leadership's decision to hold emergency national security meetings and the announcement that they are placing their missile launch sites on alert. But North Korea's continued threats also suggest that the leadership can't concede to external threats without losing face, and Kim Jong-un's questionable domestic standing may mean that conceding is not an option. It is hard to see how North Korea will unwind its escalatory activities unless it feels it has established a position of so-called strength.
Has there been any indication that the North Koreans are actually doing anything on the ground?
They've shown pictures of exercises, and there is a set of manuevers going on that have been timed in conjunction with the U.S. exercises. But there have been no unusual movements or other activities other than announcing alert status and kind of creating an atmosphere of mobilization.
It's the third anniversary this month of the sinking of the South Korean ship, the Cheonan, off the coast by North Koreans. Has that heightened tensions at all?
There was a memorial service on March 26 in South Korea where President Park Geun-hye spoke about the importance of remembering the casualties from that incident and pledging resolve. The timing of the anniversary, along with the exercises, feeds into a cycle of tension between North and South Korea.
But let me just say one thing about North Korea's usual modus operandi as it relates to threats. Where we've seen provocations, they've been guerrilla-style provocations, not something signaled in advance. North Koreans usually want the element of surprise. They have an interest in provocation where prospects of escalation are limited, and they benefit from ambiguity of attribution. I worry more about North Korea when they are not rattling the sabre.
When they do it out of the blue?
Yes. So at this point, it's unlikely that the bite is going to match the bark.
Interesting. There's been a lot of pictures of Kim Jong-un with top military officials--is he trying to assert his dominance now?
He's been visiting a lot of military units and observed some exercises. The real issue with the new leader is that it's just not clear whether the rules of the game have changed or whether the heightened decibel level of threats might have something to do with a different approach by Kim. I'm coming to the conclusion that we're seeing basically the same pattern but with some variations--and the real concern is whether, as a young leader, he may have a higher risk acceptance than his father.
Just recently, he was with Dennis Rodman watching a basketball game, right?
That was really a strange incident, where at least we did see a side of the young leader that is probably more human and in touch with what Westerners can understand. But his choice in terms of who he engages from the West does seem unconventional.
And now we have a new president and a new prime minister in China. Have they indicated how they feel about Korea at all?
My own view is that they haven't yet made a definitive review or judgment on their policy toward North Korea yet. A lot of the decisions related to the UN Security Council resolution and how they have responded to that had more to do with simply calibrating and trying to manage the situation based on the respective pressures from the international community and their interest of stability with North Korea. But I don't think we know yet what these seven top leaders' judgment collectively is going to be about how to possibly adjust the policy toward North Korea.
At the end of the old regime, there were some suggestions that they were getting a little fed up with North Korea's nuclear testing. But on the other hand, they haven't broken their aid or trade relationship.
In 2009 we saw the same cycle, where North Korea shot a rocket and did a nuclear test and there was a Security Council resolution. And at that time, a lot of people thought that the Security Council resolution showed more cooperation from China, but then a couple of months later the top leadership essentially decided to pursue a policy of hugging North Korea closer. So that's why I don't think that what we've seen yet is the actual policy judgment from the top leadership in China.
In North and South Korea relations, one bright spot had been this industrial compound in Kaesong. That's still going on, right?
It is, but the significance of the announcement from last week was that the hotline that's been suspended was used to support some of these operations. These operations could be affected by the disuse of that hotline, and of course that would inhibit South Koreans, who are running the complex, from going North. It will probably also slow the transit of goods from South Korea to Kaesong.
What does North Korea really want from the United States and South Korea?
What Pyongyang wants from the United States is basically acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and the end of the U.S. "hostile policy" toward North Korea. With South Korea, we're still at an early stage with the new South Korean president, Park Geun-hye. We're still in the early stages of a period in which both sides are going to be testing each other to see what their prospects are for a more stable relationship than what existed with the previous president.
The Obama administration came into office in 2009 and tried to extend its hand to North Korea, but that was met by a test of rockets and there's never been a revival of the Six Party Talks.
That's correct. The closest the Obama administration has come to being able to restart the Six Party Talks was the so-called "leap-day" agreement from February 29, 2012, where the United States and North Korea stated a set of parallel pledges to provide food aid and to resume international inspections of some of North Korea's nuclear facilities. But that was on the condition that North Korea would not proceed with nuclear or satellite launches, so that agreement broke down last spring when Pyongyang announced that it was going to do a satellite test.
And there hasn't been any agreement between the two governments since then?
That bilateral agreement was designed to affirm that North Korea would talk about denuclearization at the Six Party talks--so it was really the pathway to get back to Six Party Talks. The failure of that agreement seems to foreclose any prospect for renewal of the Six Party framework for the time being.
What are the chances of hostilities between North and South in the near future?
The primary danger is related to the potential for miscalculation between the two sides. And in this kind of atmosphere of tensions, that miscalculation could have deadly consequences. A second concern is the possibility--although we don't see evidence of it--that instability inside North Korea could lead to some kind of lashing out by the North, and that would obviously result in hostilities.
So at the moment there's no sign of anything happening, but there's always that risk.
Tensions are high, and the real question is whether or not North Korea's current fever is going to pass. And we see South Korea beginning to extend some olive branches; they announced they were going to resume humanitarian aid separate from denuclearization talks. So there are some potential ways that the situation could begin to calm, but North Korea has to work itself out of this frenzy before the situation settles down.
---------------------------------
So hopefully the first paragraph or the FP article will not end up like we have done in the past.
|
|
jstan
climber
|
|
when some lil prick threatens nuclear war
Ron:
Your emotional state is a mirror image of Un's. When both sides in a controversy allow themselves to be emotionally controlled by the other side, you get wars that could have been avoided. Cooler heads have a better chance of seeing the best path clearly.
The option of moving our assets into position on the down low, if I may purloin another's terminology, is not really an option. It has to be done.
The economies of the US and China are now welded at the hip so we have a good chance of avoiding conflict there. China may have to deal with a flood of immigrants crossing their border with Korea. And they show every sign of closer diplomatic exchanges with the US.
On the positive side this liability now faced by China, a liability posed by a nation apparently having nuclear capability, may make this a good time for the US, China, and Russia to put even more effort in the work to limit nuclear proliferation.
An area that needs the highest priority.
|
|
survival
Big Wall climber
Terrapin Station
|
|
The USA, lacks the will to do what we must do to win. Period.
The will to win what, exactly? To annihilate twice as many people as we have already? To spend twice as much money? To eliminate the Taliban, which will do nothing to stop Islamic fundamentalism as a whole?
|
|
ydpl8s
Trad climber
Santa Monica, California
|
|
Yeah, maybe the new Chinese government needs to buckle down and work on their immigration policy. There's probably some gainful employment to be had with that burgeoning Chinese middle class. (please forgive me...I'm being tongue-in-cheek)
|
|
healyje
Trad climber
Portland, Oregon
|
|
This is all more for the new Chinese leader's benefit than ours. More of a "I don't get no respect" sort of deal and reminding to the new Chinese government what a complete pain in the ass they can be when ignored.
|
|
Gene
climber
|
|
Why would Kim pull the trigger? He has all the guns he needs to commit personal and national suicide. But for what purpose? He knows the only way he survives is to declare victory before anything happens. There will be no preemptive strike on NK. The only way he ‘wins’ is if he does nothing and tells his poor suffering populace that the might and righteousness of Mt. Paektu has turned NK into the world’s dominant superpower.
That’s what Dear and Supreme Leaders do in Marxist dynasties.
g
|
|
lostinshanghai
Social climber
someplace
|
|
Question will be what will Kim [now that he is married] next of Kin or lack of one will do.
|
|
Don Paul
Big Wall climber
Colombia, South America
|
|
They could have icbm capabilities, they put a satellite into orbit. If they put a nuclear weapon in orbit, they could de-orbit it anytime and strike anywhere in the world regardless of distance. I think this is why they made several announcements about "smaller, lighter" nukes. But whether they really have small nukes is not known. There are probably other issues too.
The North Koreans will never give up their nuclear weapons. The question is whether they ever believe they're in a "use em or lose em" situation. If they thought war was inevitable then the obvious strategy is to hit the US bases in Japan and Guam with nukes, to neutralize US air bases. Save the other nukes for any aircraft carriers that come into range. The US always counts on air superiority and follows the same script every time, hit the command and control centers, etc.
They wont want to be the aggressor since they want the Chinese to have to honor their treaty. I havent seen the treaty but if NK starts a war Im not sure China would be obligated to defend them. The treaty is probably secret or at least has secret parts to it. Most defense treaties have classified sections that arent even mentioned in the main treaty.
The US has nothing at all to gain from pushing them any more right now, unless as someone suggested, we want to bite the bullet now, have a nuclear exchange, and kill millions of people. And the justification for that would be ... to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
|
|
Jan
Mountain climber
Okinawa, Japan
|
|
One almost certain outcome of all this is that Japan will rearm. The problems in the Senkoku Islands had many leaning in that direction and this will, in time, tip it that way.
Notice that the North Koreans have threatened South Korea, Alaska, Hawaii and Guam but have never mentioned Okinawa in Japan. This is odd from a military standpoint as we have more war capabilities here than any of the other places mentioned.
I believe this shows that the North Koreans really don't want to take on the big boys and they don't want to make an enemy of Japan given that country's ruthless conquest and exploitation of Korea for more than 50 years earlier in the 20th century.
|
|
|
SuperTopo on the Web
|
Let us know!